A Survey of the Important Decisions of the Minnesota Supreme Court: The 1990-1991 Term by unknown
William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 18 | Issue 1 Article 8
1992
A Survey of the Important Decisions of the
Minnesota Supreme Court: The 1990-1991 Term
Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law
Recommended Citation
(1992) "A Survey of the Important Decisions of the Minnesota Supreme Court: The 1990-1991 Term ," William Mitchell Law Review:
Vol. 18: Iss. 1, Article 8.
Available at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol18/iss1/8
DEVELOPMENTS
A SURVEY OF THE IMPORTANT DECISIONS OF
THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT:
THE 1990-1991 TERM
I. CIVIL PROCEDURE
Paul L. Gendler ............................... 188
II. CONSTITUTIONAL
Laura J. Benson ............................... 194
Shari L. Johnson .............................. 199
III. CONTRACT LAW
Gregory P. Brenny ............................. 205
IV. CRIMINAL LAW
Christopher A.A. Jenssen ........................ 212
V. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Heidi G. Wilfer ............................... 215
VI. EMPLOYMENT LAW
David P. Frank ............................... 219
VII. EVIDENCE
John D. Becker ................................ 229
VIII. FAMILY LAw
Ping Wang ................................... 242
IX. INSURANCE
Jeffrey J. Schueler .............................. 244
X. MUNICIPAL LAw
M ichael Fleming .............................. 251
XI. TAXATION
Philip J. Tilton ................................ 253
XII. TORTS
Victoria L. Seltun ............................. 260
XIII. WORKERS' COMPENSATION
Elizabeth A. Raleigh ........................... 262
1
et al.: A Survey of the Important Decisions of the Minnesota Supreme Cour
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1992
WILLIAM MITCHELL LA W REVIEW
I. CIVIL PROCEDURE
A. Personal Jurisdiction over Corporations
Generally, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident if, as a condition of performing some activity in
the state, the nonresident consents to such jurisdiction.' In
Rykoff-Sexton, Inc. v. American Appraisal Association, Inc. ,2 the Min-
nesota Supreme Court considered whether a registered for-
eign corporation had impliedly consented to personal
jurisdiction as a matter of state corporate law.' The court held
that the foreign corporation had irrevocably consented to per-
sonal jurisdiction by registering in Minnesota in order to trans-
act business within the state.4
The parties to the action were Rykoff-Sexton, a Delaware
corporation headquartered in California, and American Ap-
praisal Association, Inc., a Delaware corporation headquar-
tered in Wisconsin.5 The conflict arose when Rykoff and a
third party arranged for American Appraisal to complete an
appraisal and purchase of property in Los Angeles owned by
the third party.6 The contract involved none of American Ap-
praisal's twenty Minnesota employees.7 Rykoff's primary
counsel, located in Minnesota, dealt directly with American
Appraisal's California offices.8 Three years after the appraisal,
Rykoff found that American Appraisal had overstated the size
of the building by 37,000 square feet,9 thus reducing the ap-
praised value by $440,000.10
Rykoff argued that American Appraisal consented to juris-
1. See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) (approving legislation requiring
that nonresident motorists using state highways be deemed to have appointed local
official as agent to receive service of process in actions stemming from use of vehicle
within the state).
2. 469 N.W.2d 88 (Minn. 1991).
3. See id. at 89.
4. Id. at 90-91. The court also held that a denial of a motion to dismiss on the
basis of forum nonconveniens was not an abuse of discretion. Id.
5. Id. at 89.
6. Id.
7. Id. American had two offices in Minnesota which together had approximately
20 employees.
8. Rykoff's primary outside counsel, located in Minneapolis, Minnesota, negoti-
ated the appraisal contract with American's California office. The negotiations took
place over the telephone. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. Copies distributed to the California parties to the sale showed the origi-
nal appraised value to be $3,500,000. Id.
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diction in Minnesota courts for all purposes by designating an
agent for service of process pursuant to Minnesota law." The
court agreed, holding that by registering to do business in
Minnesota, pursuant to Minnesota Statutes sections 303.03,
303.06, 303.09 and 303.13, American Appraisal had irrevoca-
bly consented to service of process.'
2
Through an analysis of statutory language and legislative in-
tent, the court held that an injury need not arise out of contact
with the forum state for that state's courts to have jurisdic-
tion.' 3 Thus, in Rykoff-Sexton, Inc. v. American Appraisal Associa-
tion, Inc., the court sets forth a straightforward personal
jurisdiction analysis. The constitutional "minimum contacts"
analysis need not be applied in certain circumstances. The
court need only query whether the foreign corporation is reg-
istered to do business in Minnesota. If so, the court will have
personal jurisdiction.' 4
B. Discovery Against Employees of Parties
The method by which a party is allowed to conduct discovery
depends upon whether the information is sought from a party
or a nonparty. The court, in Wiggin v. Apple Valley Medical Clinic,
Ltd.,15 considered whether the term "party" in Rule 26.02(c) of
the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure can be construed to
include employees whose alleged negligent actions are im-
11. Id. at 90.
12. Id. The court pointed to the "well established . . . principle that a state may
exact from the nonresident, as a condition of performing some activity in the state,
consent to personal jurisdiction. Thus, consent being sufficient to create personal
jurisdiction, resort to any constitutional test is not required." Id.
13. Id. at 90-91. The court specifically addressed MINN. STAT. § 303.13 (1990).
Section 303.13(1) makes it clear that a foreign corporation registered to do business
in Minnesota shall be subject to service of process by service on its registered agent.
Nothing in that section requires that an injury arise out of contacts with Minnesota.
See MINN. STAT. § 303.13(1) (1990); see also MINN. STAT. § 303.06(l)(4) (1990) (a for-
eign corporation must "irrevocably consent to the service of process upon it as set
forth in section 303.13"). The court stated, "the legislature knows how to limit con-
sensual service of process to claims arising out of forum contacts, and apparently
chose not to do so for claims against registered corporations in Minnesota." Rykoff-
Sexton, 469 N.W.2d at 90-91 (citing Knowlton v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 900 F.2d
1196, 1199 (8th Cir. 1990)).
14. The court determined that the complaint could not be dismissed on grounds
of forum nonconveniens since "American Appraisal's corporate officers and employ-
ees are available to testify in Minnesota, and, because of deference to the plaintiff's
choice of forum .... " Id. at 91.
15. 459 N.W.2d 918 (Minn. 1990).
19921
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puted to the employer.' 6 The Wiggin court held that the mere
fact that an employee's alleged negligence could be imputed to
his employer did not make the employee a "party" under Rule
26.02(c). 7
Wiggin was a wrongful death action brought on behalf of
Kelly Marie Wiggin, who died within hours after being dis-
charged from the emergency room of the Apple Valley Medical
Clinic.' Dr. Eric Anderson treated Wiggin on the day she
died. Dr. Anderson was an occasional, part-time employee
who was paid an hourly wage. 19 He was not joined as a party in
the wrongful death action against the clinic.20
In response to a written interrogatory, the clinic disclosed
that it had taken a statement from Dr. Anderson.2 ' But the
clinic objected to producing that statement, arguing that "the
request calls for the production of statements of parties, which
are protected from discovery by Rule 26.' 22 The trial court
found no evidence that Dr. Anderson was a "managerial-type"
employee and ordered production of the statement.
23
On review, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that imput-
ing an employee's alleged negligence to an employer did not
make the employee a "party" within the meaning of Rule
26.02(c).24 The court reasoned that, since Dr. Anderson was
not a named defendant, he could not be deemed a party under
the rules of discovery. 25 The court based its decision on Leer v.
Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railway Co. ,26 which held
16. Id. at 919.
17. Id. at 920-21.
18. Wiggin died of acute bronchial asthma only hours after she was treated at the
defendant's clinic and sent home. Id. at 919.
19. Id.
20. The claim asserted that the clinic was negligent in its treatment and its dis-




24. Id. at 920-21.
25. Id. at 920.
26. 308 N.W.2d 305 (Minn. 1981). In Leer, the supreme court developed a
"bright line" definition which the Wiggin court followed. In Leer, the court stated:
The meaning of the word "party," when used in the legal sense, is clear:
"party" means only the named plaintiff or defendant. It would seem self-
evident that a statement by an employee who is neither a named plaintiff nor
a defendant is a statement of "a person who is not a party," and therefore
discoverable.
Id. at 307 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 18
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that corporate employees who are not named parties in the liti-
gation are not "parties" within the meaning of Rule 26.02(c).27
By using a "bright line rule" limiting the meaning of "party,
' 28
the court clearly followed the policy of interpreting the rules of
civil procedure broadly to favor discovery.
The consequences of the Wiggin decision are double-edged.
It promotes the policy of a broad scope of discovery and
retains a bright line rule. However, defense attorneys may
now think twice about taking statements of negligent actors
where the employer is the only named party and joinder is
unavailable.
C. Relation Back After the Statute of Limitations Has Expired
Traditionally, courts take a liberal approach toward the rela-
tion back of amendments to pleadings that do not seek to add
new parties. 29 This policy may conflict with the fundamental
policy behind the statute of limitations: to protect potential de-
fendants from stale causes of action arising out of conduct that
occurred many years before. 0 In Johnson v. Soo Line Railroad,1
the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a plaintiff will not be
permitted to amend its complaint to change the defendant one
day after the statute of limitations has run, even though the
sheriff had not yet served the original papers.3 2
On July 14, 1989, Mark W. Johnson brought an action under
the Federal Employer's Liability Act, naming Chicago & North-
27. Id. In Leer, the plaintiff sued the railroad for negligent execution of a railroad
car switching movement. The plaintiff did not bring an action against the individual
members of the switching crew but sought to discover their statements as nonparties.
The Wiggin court noted that, in Leer, the railroad, like the clinic, argued that the em-
ployees were "parties" within the meaning of Rule 26.02(c) since it was their negli-
gence the plaintiff sought to impute to the railroad. See Wiggin, 459 N.W.2d at 920
(citing Leer, 308 N.W.2d at 307).
28. Wiggin, 459 N.W.2d at 921.
29. See JACK FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 5.27, at 306 (West 1985).
30. Id.
31. 463 N.W.2d 894 (Minn. 1990).
32. Id. at 895. Under the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, the sheriff has 60
days to formally serve the defendants. In relevant part, Rule 3.01 provides:
A civil action is commenced against each defendant:
(c) when the summons is delivered to the sheriff in the county where the
defendant resides for service; but such delivery shall be ineffectual unless
within 60 days thereafter the summons is actually served on that defendant
or the first publication thereof is made.
MINN. R. Civ. P. 3.01(c).
1992]
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western Transportation Company as the defendant."3 Johnson
commenced the suit by delivering the summons and complaint
to the sheriff for service pursuant to Minnesota Rule of Civil
Procedure 3.01 .3 On July 20, one day after the statute of limi-
tations expired, Johnson realized that he should have sued Soo
Line Railroad Company, not Chicago & Northwestern Trans-
portation Company.3 5 Johnson attempted to remedy his mis-
take. He first prepared and personally served a new summons
and complaint naming Soo Line as the defendant.36 The next
day, Johnson prepared an amended summons and complaint
naming Soo Line as defendant.37 Johnson delivered the
amended summons and complaint to the sheriff.38 The sheriff
had not yet served Chicago & Northwestern Transportation
Company with the original papers.39 OnJuly 24, five days after
the statute of limitations had run, the sheriff served Soo Line
with the original papers and the amended summons and
complaint.40
Soo Line moved for summary judgment, arguing that John-
son's amended complaint did not relate back to July 14, the
date the original suit was brought.41 Johnson asserted that the
action was timely commenced on July 14, prior to the expira-
tion of the statute of limitations, by delivery of the suit papers
to the sheriff; that the action was "miscaptioned" because the
named defendant, Chicago & Northwestern, was a "misno-
mer"; and finally, that this misnomer could be corrected by
amending the original pleadings to name the intended party
defendant.
42
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that the amended com-
plaint naming Soo Line as the party defendant did not relate
back.43 Soo Line had not received notice of the institution of
33. The Federal Employer's Liability Act ("FELA") has a three year statute of
limitations period, and Johnson's right to bring an action under FELA was to expire
on July 19, 1989. Johnson, 463 N.W.2d at 895.
34. Id.; see supra note 32 for a discussion of MINN. R. Civ. P. 3.01.
35. Johnson, 463 N.W.2d at 895.








43. Id. at 894.
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the action and did not know that, but for a mistake in identity,
the action would have been brought against it.44 The court re-
fused to apply the "identity of interests" theory, reasoning that
the two railroads were entirely separate entities sharing no in-
timacy in their operations or organizational make-up. 45
Next, the court refused to apply the "misnomer" theory in
order to allow relation back. 46 The court attacked Johnson's
argument on three grounds. First, the court pointed out that
the miscaptioned pleading was never served on Chicago &
Northwestern Transportation Company.47 Second, the court
found that, since there was no identity of interests between the
corporations, service on Chicago & Northwestern Transporta-
tion Company would not have imputed notice and knowledge
to Soo Line.48 Third, the court found that Soo Line was given
actual knowledge and notice of the pleading mistake outside
the period provided by law for commencing the action against
the Soo Line.49 The phrase "within the period allowed by law
44. Id. at 897 (quoting MINN. R. Civ. P. 15.03).
45. The identity of interests doctrine was developed to aid in the determination
of whether an added party had notice of the original action. "Identity of interest"
occurs when two corporations share such an intimacy in the operations and organiza-
tion that service on one imputes notice to the other. See, e.g., Buysse v. Baumann-
Furrie & Co., 448 N.W.2d 865 (Minn. 1984) (holding that the relationship between
parent and subsidiary corporations created a sufficient identity of interests). The
court found that there were no confusing facts or circumstances that could have mis-
led Johnson into naming the wrong defendant. Johnson, 463 N.W.2d at 897.
46. Id. Johnson argued that a fair reading of the original complaint would have
indicated that Soo Line was the intended defendant. Johnson asserted that the com-
plaint talks about the "Pig's Eye Hump Yard," which Soo Line owned. Thus, John-
son argued that Soo Line should have known when it read the complaint that a
mistake had been made and that they were to be the recipient of the suit papers. Id.
Generally, the misnomer theory allows relation back amendments when:
(1) there is a misspelling or a misdescription of the intended defendant; (2) the in-
tended defendant knows or should know the suit papers were meant for him; and
(3) the intended defendant knows this at the time the miscaptioned suit papers are
served since the person served represents the intended defendant in some capacity.
Id. at 897 (citing Lange v.Johnson, 292 Minn. 320, 323, 204 N.W.2d 205, 208 (1973)
and Nelson v. Glenwood Hill Hospitals, Inc., 240 Minn. 505, 508, 68 N.W.2d 73, 78-
79 (1953)).
47. The court notes that, in a typical misnomer case, service of the miscaptioned
pleading is on the wrong defendant. This service, however, will often impart to the
intended defendant the information contained in the complaint. Johnson, 463 N.W.2d
at 898.
48. Id.
49. Johnson argued that it was inconsistent to construe Rule 15.03 to say an im-
properly identified defendant must receive notice and knowledge before the limita-
tion period expires. The court rejected the argument on three grounds. First, the
argument ignores the plain wording of Rule 15.03. Second, the court noted that a
19921
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for commencing the action" in Rule 15.03 refers to the period
allowed by the applicable statute of limitations and does not
include the grace period of Rule 3.01(c).5 °
The commencement date and the service of process date
serve different purposes and trigger two distinct events. The
Johnson v. Soo Line Railroad decision makes it clear that the sixty-
day grace period of Rule 3.01 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil
Procedure does not make an untimely complaint timely for
purposes of the relation back provisions of Rule 15.03.
Paul L. Gendler
II. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. Hate Speech and the First Amendment
Minnesota cities may now regulate cross burning and other
acts that are motivated by disrespect for a person's race, color,
creed, religion or gender without violating the First Amend-
ment's protection of speech. In In re Welfare of R.A. V.,5 the
Minnesota Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a
St. Paul City Ordinance that proscribes cross burning and
other displays which one knows or should know "arouses an-
ger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color,
creed, religion or gender .... 2 The court held that the ordi-
nance was not substantially overbroad because it could be nar-
rowly interpreted to prohibit only expressive conduct that fell
true Rule 15.03 pleading mistake does bring timely notice and knowledge of the
pleading mistake to the intended defendant as though the intended party had been
named. Third, on public policy grounds, the court delivered its fatal blow by stating:
If plaintiff's arguments were to be accepted, a plaintiff could pick some per-
son's name out of a hat (anyone would do), designate that person as defend-
ant in the original pleadings, and then take up to 60 days to settle on who of
several known candidates should really be the defendant. Statutes of limita-
tions may not be stretched so cavalierly.
Johnson, 463 N.W.2d at 898.
50. The 60-day grace period "is intended to accommodate a busy sheriff, not a
tardy plaintiff." Id.
51. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 111 S. Ct. 2795 (1991).
52. St. Paul City Ordinance section 292.02 provides:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation,
characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or
Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses
anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, reli-
gion or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor.
ST. PAUL CIrY ORDINANCE § 292.02 (1990).
[Vol. 18
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outside First Amendment protection.5" R.A.V. appealed to the
United States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari54 and
will determine the constitutionality of the ordinance during its
1991-1992 Term.
On the night of the cross burning, several men, including
R.A.V.,55 discussed "causing some skinhead trouble" and
"burning some niggers."' 56  They constructed and burned a
cross on an African American family's lawn.57 While the police
were at the victim's home, the group built two more crosses.58
When the police left, they burned one in a neighboring yard
and one in the parking lot of an apartment complex. 59 R.A.V.
was arrested and charged with violating St. Paul City Ordi-
nance section 292.02.60
In reaching its decision, the Minnesota Supreme Court im-
pliedly assumed that the ordinance was content-based and
overbroad in its original form.6 ' But the court reasoned that,
53. R.A.V, 464 N.W.2d at 507. See also Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568 (1942). In Chaplinsky, the Court defined fighting words as "those which by their
very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace." Id.
at 571. Fighting words are not protected by the First Amendment. Id.
54. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 111 S. Ct. 2795 (1991).
55. The defendant's anonymity is protected by using his initials because he is a
juvenile.
56. Brief for Appellant at 3, In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507 (Minn.
1991) (No. C8-90-1656), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 2795 (1991).
57. Id. at 4.
58. Id. at 5.
59. Id.
60. ST. PAUL CITY ORDINANCE § 292.02 (1990).
61. Content-based regulation is defined as governmental regulation which cir-
cumscribes expressive conduct because of its content. See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v.
San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (invalidating a San Diego ordinance that prohibited
all billboards containing non-commercial messages, with some exceptions, on the
grounds that the city was not entitled to choose appropriate subjects for public ex-
pression); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (invalidating a statute under which
Cohen was convicted for wearing a jacket which said "fuck the draft" because the
statute regulated the content of Cohen's speech).
Content-neutral regulations, however, usually regulate the time, place, or man-
ner of expression. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (holding that city
regulation controlling the use of trucks emitting loud noise on the street was content-
neutral since the harm associated with the trucks was not related to the content of the
noise); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (finding that city regulation
forbidding distribution of leaflets to discourage littering was content-neutral because
the harm avoided existed independently of the subject matter in the leaflets, but the
regulation was found too restrictive).
Content-based regulation is subject to greater scrutiny than content-neutral reg-
ulation. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988) (holding that statute prohibiting the
display of a sign within 500 feet of a foreign embassy, if the sign brings that govern-
19921
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whenever possible, it should narrowly construe a law "subject
to facial overbreadth attack so as to limit its scope to conduct
that falls outside First Amendment protection while clearly
prohibiting its application to constitutionally protected expres-
sion. ' '62 The court thus determined that the ordinance could
be narrowed by limiting its application to "fighting words
' 63
or conduct "directed to inciting or producing imminent law-
less action and [which] is likely to incite or produce such ac-
tion."'  The court upheld St. Paul City Ordinance section
292.0265 because it could be interpreted so as not to infringe
on protected First Amendment expression.6 6
The Minnesota Supreme Court recognized that the govern-
ment may not prohibit expression simply because society finds
it offensive, but found that argument unpersuasive in this
case. 67 The court stated, "Resort to epithets or personal abuse
• . .is not in any proper sense communication of information
or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution. ' 68 Furthermore,
in its narrowed form, the ordinance serves "the compelling
governmental interest in protecting the community against
bias-motivated threats to public safety and order."' 69 In liken-
ing cross burning to "fighting words," therefore, the court
found cross burning unworthy of First Amendment protection.
ment into "public odium" or "public disrepute," was subject to strict scrutiny be-
cause it was not content-neutral).
62. In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 509 (Minn. 1991). A regulation is
overbroad if, in addition to proscribing expression which may be constitutionally for-
bidden, it proscribes expression that is protected by the First Amendment. See gener-
ally Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844 (1970).
When a regulation is overbroad, it is struck down by the court if the speech
circumscribed by the regulation is real and substantial and judicial reconstruction is
impossible. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973). In recent years, the
United States Supreme Court has been less willing to strike down laws because of
their potential to restrict protected speech and more willing to allow state courts to
narrow the law. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (failing to invali-
date a law due to overbreadth even though some protected expression could be inad-
vertently deterred); Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1973) (invalidating
state statute where the state supreme court did not narrow construction); In re S.LJ.,
263 N.W.2d 412 (Minn. 1978) (limiting a disorderly conduct statute's applicability to
"fighting words" to preserve constitutionality).
63. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
64. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
65. ST. PAUL CITY ORDINANCE § 292.02 (1990).
66. R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d at 510.
67. Id. at 511 (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989)).
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One problem with using the "fighting words" doctrine to
narrow the ordinance is that, because the doctrine's validity is
questionable and its scope is uncertain, the ordinance may be
unconstitutionally vague.70 The "fighting words" doctrine was
narrowed significantly subsequent to Chaplinsky7' and now re-
quires virtual certainty that the expression will invoke immedi-
ate violence.72 Since Chaplinsky,73 the United States Supreme
Court has never upheld a "fighting words" conviction. It is
difficult, therefore, to ascertain the breadth and applicability of
the St. Paul ordinance as "narrowed" by the "fighting words"
doctrine.
The United States Supreme Court might analyze R.A.V. 74 in
several ways. One option is to uphold the Minnesota Supreme
Court's decision and find the ordinance 75 sufficiently narrowed
and constitutional. Such an approach would involve uphold-
ing the court's expansion of the "fighting words" doctrine
under Chaplinsky.76  The Court also could agree to expand
Chaplinsky,77 but clarify the Minnesota Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of the doctrine.
Another option for the Court is to reject Chaplinsky and nar-
row the ordinance by other means, such as creating an entirely
70. In Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 523 (1972), the Court substantially nar-
rowed the "fighting words" doctrine. It declined to invoke Chaplinsky where a person
stated, "white son of a bitch, I'll kill you" and other threatening words.
See generally Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Propo-
sal?, 1990 DUKE L.J. 484, 510 (questioning Chaplinsky's validity); Stephen W. Gard,
Fighting Words as Free Speech, 58 WASH. U. L.Q. 531, 536 (1980) (suggesting that
Supreme Court decisions since Chaplinsky have made the "fighting words" doctrine
virtually inapplicable); Thomas F. Shea, Don't Bother to Smile When You Call Me That-
Fighting Words and the First Amendment, 63 Ky. L.J. 1, 2 (1975) (stating most "fighting
words" are considered protected First Amendment speech); contra Mari J. Matsuda,
Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320
(1989) (arguing in favor of "hate crime" legislation).
71. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
72. See, e.g., Eaton v. City of Tulsa, 514 U.S. 697, 699 (1974) (reversing contempt
of court conviction for a witness' use of the word "chickenshit"); Hess v. Indiana, 414
U.S. 105, 110 (1973) (reversing conviction where a person stated during an anti-war
protest, "we'll take the fucking street later" because there was no threat of immediate
violence); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (finding no threat of immediate
violence where a person wore ajacket which said "fuck the draft"). See generally Stros-
sen, supra note 70.
73. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
74. 464 N.W.2d 507 (Minn. 1991).
75. ST. PAUL CITV ORDINANCE § 292.02 (1990).
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new category of unprotected speech.78 In New York v. Ferber,79
for example, the Court held that child pornography is unpro-
tected speech.8" But cross burning and other hate crimes,
while reprehensible, are probably not as lurid or offensive as
child pornography or the other categories of unprotected
speech. It is unlikely, therefore, that the Court will create a
new category of unprotected speech.
Alternatively, the Court could avoid traditional constitu-
tional analysis and uphold the ordinance by invoking the "sec-
ondary effects" test. This doctrine, set forth in Young v.
American Mini Theatres,"8 Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. ,82 Boos v.
Barry,"3 and Barnes v. Glenn Theatres,8 4 focuses on the effect of
the speech rather than its content. However, in Boos85 the
Court held that "the emotive impact of speech on its audience
is not a 'secondary effect.' "86 Thus, for the test to apply, the
secondary effect cannot be related to the content of the
speech. In R.A. V. ,7 however, the secondary effect is intimately
related to the content of the speech since the secondary effect
of cross burning is the emotional impact which the act has on
the victim. The "secondary effects" test, therefore, is probably
not applicable to R.A. V. 88
Finally, the United States Supreme Court might apply a
traditional method of constitutional analysis and find the ordi-
nance89 unconstitutional. The ordinance is inherently prob-
lematic because it is content-based. If the Court finds it
overbroad and not susceptible to a narrowing interpretation, it
78. If speech falls into an unprotected category, it does not receive First Amend-
ment protection. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (child pornography);
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (obscenity); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964) (defamation).
79. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
80. Id. The Court found that the real purpose of the statute was regulation of the
sexual exploitation of children, rather than prohibition of the expressive element of
child pornography. It found that the state's interest in regulating child pornography
was extremely compelling. Id.
81. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
82. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
83. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
84. 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
85. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
86. Id. at 321. The Court held that "[Il]isteners' reactions to speech are not the
type of 'secondary effects' we referred to in Renton." Id.
87. 464 N.W.2d 507 (Minn. 1991).
88. Id.
89. ST. PAUL CITY ORDINANCE § 292.02 (1990).
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will be forced to reverse the Minnesota Supreme Court's deci-
sion and strike down the ordinance.
The Minnesota Supreme Court restricted freedom of ex-
pression in Minnesota by upholding St. Paul City Ordinance
section 292.0290 in R.A. V.9 1 By invoking the "fighting words"
doctrine, however, the court left many questions unanswered
regarding the ordinance's scope and applicability. R.A. V 92 is a
victory for proponents of "hate crime" legislation and a defeat
for advocates of free speech.
Laura J. Benson
B. "Personal Data" Under the Minnesota Government Data
Practices Act
The Minnesota Government Data Practices Act (MGDPA)
was established in 1974 to govern public access to information,
statistics and records maintained by state government agen-
cies.93  In Demers v. City of Minneapolis,94  the Minnesota
Supreme Court held that information that identifies complain-
ants on a police department's nonpending, noncurrent, inter-
nal affairs complaint forms is considered "government data"
under the MGDPA.95
On March 21, 1989, Demers, a social science graduate stu-
dent at the University of Minnesota, requested access to, or
copies of, all Internal Affairs Complaint forms filed during the
previous ten years.96 The Minneapolis City Attorney re-
sponded that some information on the form was not public in-
formation under MGDPA because it was "personnel data."
97
90. Id.
91. 464 N.W.2d 507 (Minn. 1991).
92. Id.
93. MINN. STAT. § 13.01 (1990).
94. 468 N.W.2d 71 (Minn. 1991).
95. Id. For persons desiring to inspect this public data under the act, no charge
can be assessed for access to or inspection of the information or for the cost of re-
trieving and compiling documents. However, if copies of the data are requested,
only the actual cost of retrieving, compiling and copying the data can be charged.
96. Id. There was an additional request for the final disposition of these
complaints.
97. Id. at 72. The city advised Demers that information concerning the com-
plainant's name, address, telephone number, race, sex and date of birth was not pub-
lic information. Other information on the complaint form is public. Further, the city
stated that for the years 1978-1988, there were approximately 1,764 Internal Affairs
Division files and that the retrieval cost would be around $1,500.00. There would be
additional copying costs of approximately $2.00 per file.
1992]
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The city offered to supply Demers with the requested files only
after deleting all private information about the complainant.9"
Demers brought an action under Minnesota Statute section
13.08(4) to compel compliance with the MGDPA. 99
The Minnesota Supreme Court, interpreting the plain lan-
guage of the MGDPA, t00 ruled that the subjects of the com-
plaints were the police officers, not the complainants. 10 '
Accordingly, the court held that information identifying com-
plainants in the internal affairs files was not "personnel data"
at all and thus was public under section 13.03(1).102 The court
noted that section 13.43 protected the privacy of government
employees in some cases but not the privacy of individuals who
file complaints against them.
10 3
The court reasoned that the legislature intended to protect
the identities of complainants only where the person may suf-
fer harm or retaliation.' 0 4  "There is no indication that the
legislature intended to protect the identities of complainants
or police informants as a matter of course."' 5 This decision
98. To support its position, the city cited MINN. STAT. § 13.43(2) (1990). Demers,
468 N.W.2d at 72.
99. Id.
100. All government data, as provided in MINN. STAT. § 13.03(1) (1990), shall be
public unless otherwise classified by statute, temporary classification or federal law as
nonpublic. If a political subdivision resists the disclosure of data, it bears the burden
of identifying the law preventing its disclosure. MINN. STAT. § 13.03(3) (1989). The
city argued that the information on the forms constituted private "personnel data"
and hence was not public. See MINN. STAT. § 13.43(1) (1990). "Personnel data"
means data collected from an individual who is or was an employee or applicant for
employment with a state agency, statewide system or political subdivision. See also
MINN. STAT. § 13.02(5) (1990). Data on individuals "means all government data in
which any individual is or can be identified as to the subject of that data." Id.
101. Id.; see MINN. STAT. § 13.43 (1990). The statute defines the following infor-
mation as public: the employee's name, salary, job title, existence and status of em-
ployee complaints or charges. Id.
102. Demers, 468 N.W.2d at 73.
103. Id. As the court delineated, there are numerous cases where the identity of
the complainant is revealed. For example, the identity of an individual who provides
information leading to arrest, or an individual who requests law enforcement serv-
ices, is revealed. The information would be kept nonpublic if the disclosure would,
for example, threaten an individual's safety. See MINN. STAT. § 13.82 (1990) (listing
public information and occasions when protection of identities is warranted).
104. Demers, 468 N.W.2d at 74; see also MINN. STAT. §§ 13.79, 13.82(10)(d) (1990)
(protecting undercover officers, criminal sexual conduct victims and informants if
personal safety is threatened and if personal safety of victim or witness is threatened).
105. Demers, 468 N.W.2d at 73 (stating that disclosure would have little impact on
potential retaliation by the officer since the officers in these cases were already in-
formed of the complainant's identity).
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indicates that police departments should be accountable for
the manner in which they conduct their internal affairs
investigations.
C. Investigating Child Abuse and the Right to Familial Privacy
In response to the growing number of child abuse cases,
state legislatures have enacted several laws aimed at the pro-
tection of children. 10 6 One such act is the Minnesota Report-
ing of Maltreatment of Minors Act, which authorizes local
welfare and law enforcement officials to interview suspected
child abuse victims without parental notification and con-
sent.' O7 In R.S. v. State, '0' the Minnesota Supreme Court held
that the act authorizes interviews of suspected child abuse vic-
tims without parental consent in situations where the alleged
perpetrator is unknown.' 0 9
On November 12, 1987, a Hennepin County Child Protec-
tion services intake officer received a telephone call from an
anonymous informant who said that R.S.'s minor daughter,
R.M.S., could be a victim of child abuse." t0 The intake officer
determined that the caller had described sufficiently unusual
behavior."' Thus, the child protection worker notified the
Golden Valley Police Department of the report and a juvenile
officer was assigned to the case. The protection worker and
the juvenile officer decided to interview R.M.S. at her elemen-
tary school. They notified the school principal but did not no-
tify R.M.S.'s parents."12 After the interview, the protection
worker and the juvenile officer concluded that R.M.S. gave no
106. See MINN. STAT. § 626.556(1) (1990).
107. MINN. STAT. § 626.556(10)(c) (1990).
108. 459 N.W.2d 680 (Minn. 1990).
109. Id. at 690.
110. Id. at 682.
111. Id. at 683. According to the county's procedure, all telephone calls must be
reviewed by the intake officer, who must make a determination as to whether the call
is a "report" requiring an "assessment" within the meaning of MINN. STAT.
§ 626.556(2)(i)(7). " 'Assessment' includes authority to interview the child, the per-
son or persons responsible for the child's care, the alleged perpetrator and any other
person with knowledge of the abuse or neglect for the purpose of gathering the facts,
assessing the risk to the child, and formulating a plan." MINN. STAT. § 626.556(2)(i)
(1990). The report was forwarded to the supervisor of the intake unit who in turn
forwarded the case to a child protection worker for an assessment because it ap-
peared as though the allegations that tended to indicate that R.M.S. was a victim of
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indication of being victimized."t 3 Both filed a report conclud-
ing that there was no evidence of abuse. The child protection
worker also contacted R.M.S.'s parents to discuss the report.' '4
Upon learning of the interview, R.S. filed a declaratory judg-
ment action against the state and Hennepin County, alleging
that Minnesota Statutes section 626.556(10)(c) was unconstitu-
tional. R.S. claimed that "to permit school interviews of chil-
dren solely on the basis of anonymous reports and with no
attempt to assess the validity of the report prior to the inter-
view" violated their right to familial privacy." 5 On appeal, the
supreme court held that section 626.556(10)(c), which permits
interviews without parental consent, is not limited to situations
where the parent is the alleged perpetrator." 6 The court fur-
ther held that the statute did not violate the respondent's con-
stitutional right to familial privacy."
7
The supreme court examined the two ways identified by the
United States Supreme Court in which state laws may uncon-
stitutionally interfere with familial autonomy. The first occurs
when the state interferes with the family structure."' The sec-
ond concerns state interference with an individual's constitu-
tional right to make decisions regarding the family unit.' 19 In
R.S., the parents alleged the first type, that the state was in-
truding upon their family structure.
20
When the state intrudes upon a protected constitutional
right, the court must balance the person's right to privacy with
113. Id.
114. At a later date, the anonymous caller identified herself to Hennepin County
Child Protection. After interviewing all of the parties, the county closed the case with
a finding of "unable to substantiate." Id. at 684.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 687.
117. Id. at 689.
118. Id.; see also Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform,
431 U.S. 816 (1977) (holding that statutory regulatory procedures for removal of
foster children from foster homes did not violate the Due Process and Equal Protec-
tion clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment); In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298 (D. Nev.
1983) (holding that, if a state can show compelling state interest facilitated by a regu-
lation which may encroach into realm of family privacy, statute will be upheld).
119. R.S., 459 N.W.2d at 689; see also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978)
(holding that statute unnecessarily infringed on individual's right to marry in viola-
tion of Equal Protection Clause); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.
1987) (holding that statute could not form basis of civil rights claim against county
officials who separated parents from their children during investigation of alleged
child abuse).
120. R.S., 459 N.W.2d at 689.
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the state's need to interfere with that privacy.' 2 ' One's right to
familial privacy, as with other constitutional rights, is not ab-
solute. 22 Here, the court considered an interview with a re-
ported child abuse victim, without parental consent, when the
identification of the perpetrator is unknown, to be "the fastest,
most effective and least intrusive means of assessing the valid-
ity of a report of abuse.'1
2 3
The R.S. decision may warrant further review in the years to
come. In his dissent, former Chief Justice Popovich argued
that the court may have expanded too much the authority of
local welfare agencies to interview without parental consent.
24
The Chief Justice lamented the fact that a presumption has
been created that parents, "by virtue of the fact they are
parents, are the abusers of their children until proven
otherwise." 
2 5
D. Freedom of Conscience Under the Minnesota Constitution
Minnesota Statutes section 169.522 requires that all slow-
moving vehicles display a slow-moving vehicle emblem
(SMV). 12 6 In State v. Hershberger,127 the Minnesota Supreme
Court held that the application of this statute violated the free-
dom of conscience rights as protected by the Minnesota Con-
stitution, of Amish defendants who travel in animal-drawn
vehicles. '
28
As a part of being separated from the modem world, the
Amish do not travel by automobiles but, instead, by horse and
buggy. To the Amish, displaying the emblem's loud yellow-
orange and red colors "would be putting their faith in 'worldly
symbols' rather than in God."' 29 The Amish claimed that the
statute infringed upon their right to freely exercise their reli-
gious beliefs given to them by the First Amendment of the
121. State v. Odenbrett, 349 N.W.2d 265, 269 (Minn. 1984).
122. R.S., 459 N.W.2d at 689.
123. Id. at 690.
124. Id. at 692 (Popovich, CJ., dissenting) (arguing that the majority failed to ac-
knowledge the balance of interests which the legislature saw: respect for family pri-
vacy and the need for effective intervention).
125. Id. at 695.
126. MINN. STAT. § 169.522 (1990).
127. 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990).
128. Id.
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United States Constitution and Article I, Section 16 of the Min-
nesota Constitution.1
3 0
When first confronted with this case, the Minnesota
Supreme Court found that Minnesota Statute section 169.522
infringed upon the Amish's rights that are guaranteed by the
Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution.' 3' However, the
court declined to address whether the statute violated the
Amish's right to freedom of conscience, as guaranteed by the
Minnesota Constitution. The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari, vacated the decision and remanded the case
for further consideration.' 32 Upon further review, the Minne-
sota Supreme Court held that the statute violated the Amish's
state constitutional rights.1
33
The court found that, even though the state has an interest
in public safety, it must demonstrate that the interest cannot
be achieved through reasonable alternative means. The gov-
ernmental interests which may outweigh religious liberty are
limited under the Minnesota Constitution to protecting the
peace and public safety or protecting against acts of licentious-
ness.'14  In Hershberger, the state failed to demonstrate that
public safety could not be ensured through the Amish's sug-
gested use of white reflective tape and a lighted red lantern. 35
130. Id.
131. Id. at 289.
132. Minnesota v. Hershberger, 110 S. Ct. 1918 (1990). On remand the Minne-
sota Supreme Court was asked to consider whether Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S.
Ct. 1595 (1990), was controlling. In Smith, the Supreme Court held that the right of
free exercise does not relieve an individual of his or her duty to comply with a valid
law of general applicability on the grounds that the law proscribes conduct that is
contrary to a religious practice. Id. at 1600. Smith dispensed with the traditional
compelling state interest test except for hybrid cases - claims involving free exercise
in conjunction with other constitutional protections. Id. at 1601. The Minnesota
Supreme Court declined to rest its decision on the uncertain meaning of Smith be-
cause the Minnesota Constitution provided an independent and adequate basis on
which to decide. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d at 397.
133. Id. at 399.
134. Id. at 397; see Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 707 (1986) (holding that the inter-
est in avoiding case-by-case inquiries in administration of social security benefits out-
weighs religious freedom); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 508 (1986)
(holding that the military's interest in uniformity and discipline outweighs individ-
ual's interest in wearing yarmulke).
135. Hershberger, 402 N.W.2d at 398; see State v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn.
1990) (holding that an exemption based on religious grounds would be required
under the Minnesota Constitution, but if the state demonstrates compelling and
overriding state interest in statutory regulation, exemption will not be granted); State
v. Sports & Health Club, 370 N.W.2d 844, 853 (Minn. 1985) ("government has an
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The court found that the state failed to demonstrate why the
Amish proposal was an insufficient warning to other drivers.'
The Hershberger decision properly protects the personal lib-
erties found in the Minnesota Constitution to a greater extent
than was required by the United States Supreme Court.
Although it often may be advantageous to construe state provi-
sions in harmony with federal provisions, Hershberger demon-
strates a situation in which competing interests can and should
be balanced.
E. Housing Discrimination
In State by Cooper v. French,'3 7 the court held that the Minne-
sota Human Rights Act's prohibition of housing discrimina-
tion, on the basis of marital status, did not prohibit a landlord
from refusing to rent to an unmarried couple who wished to
live together.
The court's reasoning included the landlord's religious be-
liefs and the fact that the state still has a "fornication stat-
ute." ' 38 The court held that the Human Rights Act did not
expressly repeal the fornication statute, and thus the Act could
not have been meant to protect those who would fornicate.
The court also cited the legislative history of the Human
Rights Act, and concluded that the Act did not include unmar-




A. Economic Loss Arising from Sale of Goods
Contract and tort remedies may overlap when a sale of
goods causes damage to other property. In Hapka v. Paquin
Farms,'4 the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the Uniform
Commercial Code exclusively controls damage determinations
overriding compelling interest in prohibiting discrimination in employment and pub-
lic accommodation").
136. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d at 399.
137. 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990).
138. MINN. STAT. § 609.34 (1990).
139. For a complete discussion of the case, see Donna Bailey, Case Note, Anti-
Discrimination Law-Marital Status Discrimination: Public Scorn of Personal Choices, 17 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 563 (1991).
140. 458 N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 1990).
1992]
19
et al.: A Survey of the Important Decisions of the Minnesota Supreme Cour
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1992
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
relating to commercial transactions involving damage to other
property.' 4 ' Hapka essentially overruled Superwood Corp. v.
Siempelkamp Corp. 142 and the line of cases which followed it.
However, in 1991, the Minnesota Legislature effectively rein-
stated Superwood by enacting Minnesota Statutes section
604.10, which defines the economic loss remedies available for
damage to other property arising from the sale of goods.'
4
1
The Hapka decision seemed to stem from a fear that tort law
might somehow derogate the UCC, 44 which was intended to
displace tort liability.'4 5 To justify overruling Superwood,146 the
Hapka court reasoned that Superwood did not involve damage to
other property, and therefore, the "other property" exception
created by Superwood was simply dicta. 47 Next, the court sug-
gested that Superwood was based on consumer transactions
rather than commercial transactions. 4  Finally, the court
stated tort remedies were not necessary for sophisticated par-
ticipants in commercial transactions, and parties should nego-
tiate liability limitations. 
4 9
Under section 604.10, which renders Hapka obsolete,
merchants and non-merchants may both recover in tort for
141. Id. at 688.
142. 311 N.W.2d 159 (Minn. 1981).
143. The section will read:
(a) Economic loss that arises from a sale of goods that is due to damage to
tangible property other than the goods sold may be recovered in tort as well
as in contract, but economic loss that arises from a sale of goods between
parties who are each merchants in goods of the kind is not recoverable in
tort.
(b) Economic loss that arises from a sale of goods, between merchants, that
is not due to damage to tangible property other than the goods sold may not
be recovered in tort.
(c) The economic loss recoverable in tort under this section does not in-
clude economic loss due to damage to the goods themselves.
Act of June 4, 1991, ch. 352, § 2, 1991 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 1923 (West) (to be
codified at MINN. STAT. § 604.10).
144. See Hapka, 458 N.W.2d at 688.
145. The Code provides for both consequential and incidental damages when ap-
propriate. Id. at 688 (citing MINN. STAT. § 336.2-714(3) (1990)).
146. See Superwood, 311 N.W.2d at 162 ("economic losses that arise out of com-
mercial transactions, except those involving personal injury or damage to other prop-
erty, are not recoverable in negligence or strict products liability").
147. Hapka, 458 N.W.2d at 686-87; see also Superwood, 311 N.W.2d at 160 (limiting
damage to the item actually sold in the transaction).
148. Hapka, 458 N.W.2d at 687 (implying that the Supenwood court's reasoning was
unsound).
149. The Code encourages parties to negotiate aspects of liability, including the
limitation thereof. Therefore, parties should contract their exposure and avoid tort
liability. See id. at 688.
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economic loss due to damage to other property. 150 However,
in sales transactions between merchants in goods of the kind, tort
recoveries are not available for economic loss due to damage
to other property.' 5' Thus, contrary to the Hapha decision,
tort recovery for economic loss because of damage to other
property is now precluded only between merchants in goods of
the kind, and not precluded in other commercial transactions.
Consequently, the practitioner must first determine whether
damage to other property arising from the sale of goods is eco-
nomic loss. Next, the practitioner must look at the status of
the parties to the transaction. Only after these two questions
are answered may the practitioner ascertain whether tort re-
coveries are available for damage to other property arising
from the sale of goods.
B. Breach of a Confidentiality Promise
A journalist's promise to keep a news source anonymous is
protected by journalistic ethics. 5 2 A promise of confidentiality
is a common practice in the industry and one that is expected
to be kept.' 5 ' In Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.,"' the Minnesota
Supreme Court held that a promise to keep a news source
anonymous was not enforceable under either contract or
promissory estoppel theories. t 5 Recently, the United States
Supreme Court reversed the Minnesota Supreme Court's hold-
ing that the First Amendment does not preclude enforcement
of a promise on a promissory estoppel theory. 15 6 The Minne-
150. "Merchant" is defined in Minnesota's Uniform Commercial Code. MINN.
STAT. § 336.2-104 (1990). However, economic loss is not defined within the statute.
Recent cases have considered damage to other property to be non-economic loss in
order to prevent the applicability of the statute. See T.H.S. Northstar Assoc., Ltd. v.
W.R. Grace & Co., 767 F. Supp. 969, 974 (D. Minn. 1991) ("economic loss depends
on if the product failed to perform as contracted or as expected."); see also Independ-
ent Sch. Dist. No. 197 v. W.R. Grace & Co., 752 F. Supp. 286, 299 (D. Minn. 1990).
151. Act ofJune 4, 1991, ch. 352, § 2, 1991 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 1923 (West) (to
be codified at MINN. STAT. § 604.10).
152. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199, 203 (Minn. 1990), rev'd, 111 S.
Ct. 2513 (1991).
153. Cohen, 457 N.W.2d at 201.
154. 457 N.W.2d at 199.
155. Id. at 200.
156. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991). The Supreme Court
held, in a five-four decision, the First Amendment did not prohibit a source from
recovering damages for breach of a confidentiality promise under a promissory es-
toppel theory. Id. at 2516. This decision reversed the Minnesota Supreme Court's
conclusion that the First Amendment barred promissory estoppel recovery. See id. at
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sota Supreme Court subsequently reinstated Cohen's original
award based on the theory of promissory estoppel.' 57
The plaintiff, Dan Cohen, separately approached Lori
Sturdevant, a Minneapolis Star Tribune reporter, and Bill Sal-
isbury, a St. Paul Pioneer Press reporter. t5 8  Cohen stated to
each that he may have pertinent information relating to the
1982 state gubernatorial election.' 5 9 In exchange for this in-
formation, Cohen requested a promise of confidentiality.'
60
Each reporter orally promised to keep Cohen's identity anony-
mous. 16 ' After a vigorous debate within each editorial staff,
the newspapers independently decided to identify Cohen in
the published article.' 6 The day the newspaper articles were
published, Cohen was fired by his employer. 6 ' Additionally,
Cohen was ridiculed by the newspapers for "sleazy" tactics.' 6
Cohen's complaint asserted claims of fraudulent misrepre-
sentation and breach of contract.' 65 The trial court ruled that
the First Amendment did not bar either claims, and the jury
found the defendants liable for both claims. 166 The court of
appeals affirmed the jury's finding of a breach of contract, but
2517. The United States Supreme Court remanded the case to the Minnesota
Supreme Court for a determination of whether promissory estoppel allowed recov-
ery. Id. at 2520.
157. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 479 N.W.2d 387 (Minn. 1992).
158. Cohen, 457 N.W.2d at 200. Cohen also met with reporters for the Associated
Press and WCCO-TV. These entities are not implicated in the present action. Id. at
201 n.1.
159. The information related to Marlene Johnson, the DFL candidate for lieuten-
ant governor. The information consisted of public court records pertaining to un-
lawful assembly and petty theft actions against Johnson. Id. at 200.
160. Cohen stated to each reporter that he would furnish the documents only if he
would be treated as an anonymous source, his name would not appear in any con-
nected material, and no further questioning would take place. Id.
161. Both reporters intended to keep this promise. However, each reporter's
promise of confidentiality was subject to approval or revocation by his or her editor,
but Cohen was never informed of this fact. Id.
162. Id. at 201.
163. Id. at 202. Cohen was employed as a public relations officer with a Minneap-
olis advertising firm. He was also a known Wheelock Whitney supporter and working
on the Whitney campaign. The court stated that Cohen would qualify as a public
figure. Id. at 201 n.3.
164. On at least two occasions subsequent to the disclosure, the Star Tribune at-
tacked Cohen's tactics. Id. at 202.
165. The fraud claim is treated very cursorily in the opinion. A misrepresentation
of past or present fact must exist to show fraud. Since it is undisputed that both
reporters intended to keep their promises, a fraud claim cannot exist. Id.
166. The jury awarded the plaintiff $200,000 in compensatory damages and
$250,000 in punitive damages. Id. at 200.
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ruled as a matter of law that misrepresentation had not been
proven.' 67 The Minnesota Supreme Court granted review, af-
firmed the dismissal of plaintiff's fraudulent misrepresentation
claim, and reversed the allowance of the breach of contract
claim.' 68 In doing so, the Minnesota Supreme Court held a
promise to keep a news source anonymous is not enforceable
under a breach of contract claim or, in this case, promissory
estoppel. 16 9
Despite the existence of a clear-cut promise, the majority
reasoned that neither party intended to create a legally binding
contract. 170 Since a contract is not created when the parties
intend none, the court concluded each party assumed the risks
of exposure protected only by the good faith of the other, and
contract law was an inappropriate remedy for these circum-
stances.17' Next, the court analyzed whether enforcement of
the promise by promissory estoppel would do injustice to the
First Amendment. 172 The court thought it of "critical signifi-
cance" that the promise of anonymity arose in the quintessen-
tial public debate context-a political source involved in a
political campaign. 173 The court reasoned that public debate
would be chilled if broken promises of confidentiality in this
context exposed participants to civil liability. '74 Given this sce-
nario, the court concluded that the enforcement of the confi-
dentiality promise would violate the defendants' First
Amendment rights. 175 However, the court specifically stated
that instances may exist where the confidential promise given
by a reporter would be protected by a promissory estoppel
167. The two-one court of appeals decision agreed that the First Amendment was
not implicated. The court of appeals further stated that, even if the First Amendment
was implicated, the state had a compelling interest and the newspapers waived these
rights. Id.
168. Id. Consequently, the plaintiff was unable to recover any damages for the
breach of promised confidentiality.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 202-03. The court did not embrace a vagueness argument because of
the existence of a clear-cut promise. Id. at 203.
171. Supporting this proposition is the fact that the law does not consider every
exchange of promises binding. Id
172. See id. at 204-05.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 205.
175. Id. The court made certain that its decision was limited to the fact situation
when it stated "we need not decide more than we have to." Id.
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theory. 7 6
In Cohen, the expansion of the reach of contract law and
promissory estoppel outside of commercial transactions was
tempered. 77 The court found it significant that journalistic
ethics have provided protection for a confidential source,
78
and it was reluctant to extend contract and promissory estop-
pel recoveries into an area deemed to be adequately protected.
However, the court left the gate open, if ever so slightly, for
possible recovery under promissory estoppel by the aggrieved
confidential source.
79
From this adverse decision of the Minnesota Supreme
Court, Cohen appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
The Court, in a five-to-four decision authored by Justice
White, 80 held that the First Amendment did not bar promis-
sory estoppel causes of action against the press.'8 ' The judi-
cial enforcement of a promissory estoppel claim, although
private, is state action within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment and therefore might implicate the First Amend-
ment. 8 2 The doctrine of promissory estoppel, however, is
generally applicable to all areas of the law, is unrelated to the
suppression of free speech, and does not target any specific
group for enforcement. Promissory estoppel is, therefore,
available in causes of action against the press. But the press is
subject to the same scrutiny in enforcement as against other
potential defendants. Any subsequent inhibition on reporting
is incidental and insignificant with regards to the application of
a general rule of law.' 83 Since the Minnesota Supreme Court
did not decide the case on the theory of promissory estoppel,
176. Id. (stating some interests of the state must outweigh First Amendment
considerations).
177. See id. at 199.
178. Id. at 203.
179. See id. at 205.
180. Justice White was joined in the majority by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Jus-
tices Stevens, Scalia and Kennedy.
181. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S.Ct. 2513, 2516 (1991).
182. Id. at 2517-18.
183. Id. at 2518-19. In dissent, Justice Blackmun, joined by justices Marshall and
Souter, agreed with the majority that the Minnesota Supreme Court decided the case
on federal grounds and that judicial enforcement of promissory estoppel claims is
state action under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 2520 (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing). He disagreed, however, on the use of the generally applicable law of promis-
sory estoppel to penalize truthful reporting of political information. Id.
Furthermore, Justice Blackmun viewed Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, as control-
ling over Cohen. In Falwell, the Court prevented Virginia's generally applicable law on
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the United States Supreme Court remanded the case to the
Minnesota Supreme Court for a determination of whether the
state law of promissory estoppel, as applied in Minnesota,
might honor Cohen's original jury verdict and thereby force
the press to honor its reporters' promises.
8 4
On remand, the Minnesota Supreme Court, in an opinion
authored by Justice Simonett, allowed Cohen to argue promis-
sory estoppel despite his failure to originally plead the theory
in his complaint.'8 5 Furthermore, the court declined to pro-
vide Minnesota's guarantee of freedom of the press8 6 greater
scope than that afforded by the First Amendment.' "The full
First Amendment implications of this new issue may not yet
have surfaced."' 88 The court then upheld Cohen's original
jury award of compensatory damages under the promissory es-
toppel theory. Focusing on the third prong of the promissory
estoppel analysis, which requires the court to enforce a prom-
ise "to prevent injustice," the court noted that to deny "Cohen
any recourse would be unjust."' 8 9 The court reached this con-
clusion because the newspapers generally believed they must
honor promises of confidentiality and a refusal to remedy a
disregard of that belief would be unjust. 9 0
In an era in which state courts have greater latitude to ex-
pand the scope of liberty protections beyond that endorsed
under the federal Constitution, the Minnesota Supreme Court
the infliction of emotional distress from penalizing the publication of political opin-
ion. Id. at 50 n.3.
In a separate dissent, Justice Souter, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun and
O'Connor, also agreed that there was "nothing talismanic" about the general appli-
cability of a body of law in removing First Amendment considerations. Cohen, Il1 S.
Ct. at 2522 (Souter, J., dissenting). Nor did Justice Souter agree with the majority in
not applying a balance of interests because the burden of the promise had been self
imposed by the newspapers, which "suggest[ed] the possibility of waiver, the require-
ments for which have not been met here." Id. at 2522-23 (citations omitted).
Each of the four dissenters agreed that the general applicability of a body of law
should not effectively preempt First Amendment issues. Since the majority relied on
this point in invalidating the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision that the First
Amendment had been violated, a one-Justice shift might alter the law.
184. Id. at 2519-20. The Court also suggested that the Minnesota Constitution
could be used to shield the press from promissory estoppel liability. Id. at 2520.
185. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 479 N.W.2d 387 (Minn. 1992).
186. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 3.
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paralleled its own freedom of the press guarantees to that of
the United States Supreme Court. This adherence to estab-
lished precedent promotes future certainty in press reporting.
Moreover, the establishment of the recognized doctrine of
promissory estoppel to all areas of the law, including promises
between the press and its sources, ensures predictability in
such relations, as in all other promissory relations, the very
purpose of mutual contractual promises.
Gregory P. Brenny
IV. CRIMINAL LAW
A. Defining the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines
In State v. Hartfeld,'9 ' the court refined the method of com-
puting a defendant's criminal history score under the Minne-
sota Sentencing Guidelines. Hartield answered a question that
was not addressed in State v. Hernandez,' 92 where the court held
that, when sentencing a defendant for multiple, separate of-
fenses, the trial court may increase the sentence once for each
felony conviction in the offender's criminal history. Hartfield
placed a critical limitation on the Hernandez method by holding
that each criminal conviction must involve a separate behav-
ioral incident and a different victim.
In Hartfield, the defendant unlawfully entered the victim's
condominium and sexually assaulted her. The defendant was
convicted of burglary and criminal sexual assault in the first
degree.' 93 While sentencing the defendant for sexual assault,
the trial court assigned the defendant one criminal history
point for the burglary conviction.' 94 The trial court then
doubled the defendant's sentence because he had invaded the
victim's zone of privacy. 195 The court of appeals affirmed with-
191. 459 N.W.2d 668 (Minn. 1990). The court interpreted MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 609.035, 609.585 and Sentencing Guidelines, Comment II B.102, MINN. STAT.
ANN. ch. 244 app., as precluding the use of multiple convictions to increase the crimi-
nal history score of a defendant when the convictions are part of a single behavioral
pattern. Id. at 669.
192. 311 N.W.2d 478 (Minn. 1981).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. The trial court then departed to double the guidelines' sentence because the
defendant had invaded the complainant's zone of privacy by raping her in her own
home. Harfield, 459 N.W.2d at 669-70. See State v. Morales, 324 N.W.2d 374 (Minn.
1982) (approving upward departure for invading complainant's zone of privacy).
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out opinion. 196
In deciding whether using the Hernandez method was permis-
sible when the two crimes at issue stemmed from one behav-
ioral incident, the supreme court studied the interplay between
the guidelines, the "double jeopardy" burglary statute 97 and
Minnesota Statutes section 609.035.198 The court held that,
under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, when a defend-
ant is sentenced for multiple crimes that occur during the same
behavioral incident, the "earlier" offense should not increase
the criminal history score of the "later" offense.' 99 Thus, a de-
fendant may be sentenced for multiple crimes on the same day
when those crimes occurred in the same behavioral incident as
long as the Hernandez method is not used to increase the de-
fendant's criminal history score.
B. Venue and the Place Where an Alleged Crime Occurred
The Minnesota Supreme Court recently examined a Minne-
sota venue statute that allows persons accused of child abuse
to be tried either in the county in which the crime occurred or
in the county where the child is found.20 0 Article 1, section 6,
of the Minnesota Constitution grants a criminal defendant the
right to a trial by a jury in the county where the crime oc-
curred.2°' In State v. Krjci,2 °2 the court held that a defendant's
right to trial in the county where the crime occurred is not vio-
lated by application of the child abuse venue statute.
At his home in Renville County, Krejci fractured the skull of
his twenty-one-month-old son. He and his wife failed to gain
medical attention for the child until two weeks later, when as a
result of the assault, the child went into a coma while visiting in
Hennepin County. 0 3 Hospital authorities notified the police
196. Hartield, 459 N.W.2d at 670-71 (holding that double durational departure
justified).
197. Id. at 670; see MINN. STAT. § 609.585 (1990). This section states that prosecu-
tion or conviction for burglary does not bar the conviction of any crime committed
upon entering the building. Id.
198. See MINN. STAT. § 609.035 (1990). Prior to the enactment of the sentencing
guidelines, this section, the so-called "single behavioral incident" statute, governed
the sentencing of multiple offenses committed within the same time frame.
199. See Sentencing Guidelines, II B. 102, MINN. STAT. ANN. ch. 244 app. at 394
(West Supp. 1992).
200. MINN. STAT. § 627.15 (1990).
201. MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 6.
202. 458 N.W.2d 407 (Minn. 1990).
203. Id. at 409.
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who arrested the defendant and charged him in Hennepin
County.
204
The defendant claimed that venue in Hennepin County was
improper because no element of the crime occurred there.20 5
The trial court applied Minnesota Statutes section 627.15 and
found venue to be proper in Hennepin County because the
child was found there.2 6 The court of appeals denied defend-
ant's petition for writ of prohibition or mandamus and the trial
court subsequently found the defendant guilty of first degree
assault. Upon further review, the court of appeals held that
section 627.15 was unconstitutional and remanded for trial in
Renville County. °7
The Minnesota Supreme Court considered whether section
627.15 violates article 1, section 6, of the Minnesota Constitu-
tion by allowing venue in the county where a child abuse victim
is found.208 Where different elements of a crime are commit-
ted in different venues, the constitution does not command a
single venue. 20 9 The constitution requires only that an offense
be tried where an element of that offense occurred. In State v.
Smith,2 1° an earlier case, the court held that venue was proper
in a county where a homicide victim was found even though
the victim was killed in a different county. The court also
stated that the focus on venue should be on the convenience of
the trier of fact rather than on the power of the district to hear
the case.21 '
In Krci, the court only implicitly determined that an ele-
ment of a crime occurs in a "county where a child is found."
Instead, the court focused on the legislature's long-recognized
204. Id.
205. A second issue decided by the court was whether the defendant's waiver of
counsel was valid. Id. at 408. The court held that the waiver was valid pursuant to
State v. Pietraszewski, 283 N.W.2d 887, 889-90 (Minn. 1979). Krejci, 458 N.W.2d at
413.
206. Kreci, 458 N.W.2d at 409. The complaint included charges of first degree
assault, neglect of a child and malicious punishment. Id. Krejci waived his right to a
jury trial in exchange for dismissal of the neglect of a child and malicious punishment
charges and an 85 month sentence cap if found guilty of first degree assault. Id. The
defendant did not request a change of venue to Renville County. Id.
207. State v. Krejci, 441 N.W.2d 510, 514 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
208. Krjci, 458 N.W.2d at 409.
209. Id. at 410 (citing United States v. Reed, 773 F.2d 477, 480 (2d Cir. 1985)).
210. 421 N.W.2d 315, 320 (Minn. 1988) (construing MINN. R. CRIM. P. 24.02(4) in
light of constitutional limits on jurisdiction).
211. Krejci, 458 N.W.2d at 410.
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authority to "expand upon the constitutional provisions relat-
ing to venue. "212 The Krejci court noted the existence of spe-
cial venue problems in child abuse cases2I3 and approved the
use of section 627.15 in cases other than those in which the
child victim "has no idea in which county the abuse
occurred.
214
The Kreici dissent focused on the specific elements of the
crime charged, first degree assault.21 5 An assault is the inten-
tional infliction of, or attempt to inflict, bodily harm upon an-
other. t6 As such, "finding" the victim is not a specified
element of the crime as defined by statute. Therefore, the dis-
sent found this application of the special venue statute to be
unconstitutional because it found venue to be proper in the
county where no element of the crime was committed.2 17
The rule of Krejci is simple. In child abuse cases, venue is
proper where the crime is revealed. This revelation is an ele-




A. Right to Counsel Before Blood Alcohol Testing
Minnesota Statutes section 169.123 grants the right to con-
sult with an attorney after submitting to a blood alcohol test.
2 8
But the Minnesota Supreme Court recently held that the con-
stitutional right to counsel arises before the test is adminis-
tered.21 9 In Friedman v. Commissioner of Public Safety,220 the court
held that, under the Minnesota Constitution, blood alcohol
212. Id. at 410-11.
213. Id. at 411.
214. The court of appeals had adopted this narrow interpretation. See Krejci, 458
N.W.2d at 411 (citing State v. Norton, 328 N.W.2d 142, 144 n.1 (Minn. 1982)).
215. Kreci, 458 N.W.2d at 414 (Kelley, J., dissenting).
216. MINN. STAT. § 609.02, subd. 10(2) (1990).
217. Krdci, 458 N.W.2d at 414 (Kelley, J., dissenting). Justice Kelley was uncon-
vinced by the argument that because a crime goes undetected before it is revealed,
revelation is an element to every crime. Id.
218. MINN. STAT. § 169.123, subd. 2(b)(4) (1990).
219. Friedman v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828 (Minn. 1991).
220. 473 N.W.2d 828 (Minn. 1991).
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testing constitutes a "critical stage ' 22 1 and that persons must
be allowed to consult with an attorney before submitting to
testing.
On March 12, 1989, Joy Friedman was stopped by a Minne-
apolis police officer and agreed to submit to a breath test.
22 2
Friedman failed the preliminary breath test, was arrested and
was taken to the police station.223 At the station, the officer
read the implied consent advisory breath test to Friedman
three times.224 Friedman told the officer that she didn't under-
stand the advisory and that she had already been tested.225
The state subsequently revoked Friedman's driver's license for
one year.226
Historically, the court has ruled that submitting to a breath
test does not constitute a "critical stage" because revocation of
a driver's license has been deemed a civil, rather than criminal,
proceeding.227 However, beginning in Prideaux v. Department of
Public Safety,228 the court began to question the "civil" nature
of the proceeding and instead began to view the situation as
one which could lead to criminal proceedings if the results of
the testing so warranted.229
The Friedman court applied a balancing test for weighing the
221. Id. at 833. A critical stage is one where pretrial procedure "would impair
defense on the merits if the accused is required to proceed without counsel." Id.
222. Id. at 829.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. The officer construed Friedman's response as a refusal to allow the test to be
readministered. Id.
226. Id. Revocation of a license for refusal to submit to a blood test is allowed by
MINN. STAT. § 169.123, subd. 4 (1990).
227. Friedman, 473 N.W.2d at 832. The respondent in this case based its argument
on State v. Palmer, 291 Minn. 302, 191 N.W.2d 188 (1971). In Palmer, the defend-
ant's license had been revoked pursuant to a DWI violation. The court in Palmer
reasoned that revocation of a defendant's license was a civil proceeding rather than a
criminal matter. Id. at 306, 191 N.W.2d at 190. Since it was a civil proceeding, no
constitutional right to counsel was triggered and, therefore, the defendant had no
right to refuse blood alcohol testing prior to conferring with his attorney. Id. at 307,
191 N.W.2d at 190-91.
228. 310 Minn. 405, 247 N.W.2d 385 (1976).
229. Id. Evidence obtained through the administration of blood alcohol testing
could ultimately be used in the prosecution of a "driving under the influence"
charge. The court further reasoned that revocation of a driver's license for six
months may have a more devastating effect on a person than a jail sentence or impo-
sition of a fine. Id. See also Nyflot v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 369 N.W.2d. 512
(Minn. 1985) (decided under federal constitutional law and therefore inapplicable
because protections extended to individuals under the Minnesota Constitution are
more extensive than those extended under the federal Constitution).
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intrusion imposed upon the driver against the state's inter-
est.23 0 Because the driver faced possible revocation of her li-
cense for failure to submit to the breath test and could also be
convicted for a DWI offense even without taking the test, 23 ' the
court held that the defendant was at a "critical stage ' 23 2 and
was guaranteed the right to counsel.
B. Warrantless "Sweep" Searches
In State v. Alayon,233 the court upheld the constitutionality of
a sixty-second sweep search by police officers to prevent the
destruction of evidence while a search warrant was being ob-
tained. In Alayon, undercover police officers staged the
purchase of illegal drugs at a home occupied by the defend-
ant.2 34 When the defendant answered the door and began to
come outside and close the door behind him, the undercover
officer displayed his badge, pulled out his gun and ordered
Alayon to lie down.235 The undercover officer and several
other police officers entered the house and made a sixty-sec-
ond "sweep" to make sure that no one in the house would de-
stroy the evidence while another officer obtained a search
warrant. 236 A woman who rented the home consented to a
thorough search before police returned with a search war-
rant.237 The Minnesota Supreme Court held that the sweep
search did not violate the defendant's Fourth Amendment
rights.238
The Fourth Amendment protects against "unreasonable
searches and seizures ' 23 9 and requires that a warrant, issued
"upon probable cause, "240 must be obtained prior to con-
230. See Friedman, 473 N.W.2d at 834-35.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 835.
233. 459 N.W.2d 325 (Minn. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 757 (1991).
234. As part of the operation, one of the officers gave part of the money to a
"runner." Another undercover police officer followed the runner for three quarters
of a mile, and observed the runner enter a house, come back out after about five
minutes, and return to the scene to complete the trade of the money and the drugs.
Alayon, 459 N.W.2d at 326-27.
235. Id. at 327. The defendant was not informed he was under arrest at this time.
236. Id.
237. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973) (holding that con-
sent to search must be voluntary).
238. Id.
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ducting a search. A major exception to this rule was estab-
lished in Terry v. Ohio, 24 ' where the United States Supreme
Court held that police officers are allowed to conduct a "pat-
down" of suspects if there are "exigent circumstances" which
require a search to preserve the officer's safety.242 Later, in
Maryland v. Buie,24s the Court allowed a "quick protective
sweep" of a house, much like the "pat-down" of the suspects
allowed in Tery .2 44 The Court's reasoning in Buie was that a
quick search of the premises was analogous to a quick search of
a person, and should be allowed to preserve officer safety. 245
In Alayon, the Minnesota court considered whether Terry and
Buie could be extended to allow preservation of the evi-
dence. 246 Although Alayon was decided on the grounds that
probable cause existed, the court hinted that a sweep search to
support evidence could be supported by the lower Terry stan-
dard. This issue remains for another day.
C. Search By Private Party
Evidence in criminal prosecutions must be obtained in com-
pliance with the Fourth Amendment's search and seizure re-
quirements.2 47 In State v. Buswell,248 the Minnesota Supreme
Court held that a private security agency was not governed by
241. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The Court applied a balancing test and weighed the gov-
emmental interests involved against the privacy of the individuals searched. Id. at
20-22. The Court held that, where an officer justifiably believes an individual whom
he is investigating at close range is armed, it would be "unreasonable" to deny the
officer the opportunity to take reasonable measures to "neutralize" the danger. Id. at
26-27. The Court confined the scope of the search to the area necessary to protect
the officers and any others who may be nearby. Id. at 29.
242. Id. "Exception to rule requiring search warrant is presence of exigent or
emergency-like circumstances as, for example, presence of weapons in a motor vehi-
cle stopped on highway and such exigent circumstances permit warrantless search
and seizure." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 574 (6th ed. 1990).
243. 110 S. Ct. 1093 (1990) (holding that no violation of Fourth Amendment oc-
curs if a limited protective sweep is based on a reasonable belief and specific articul-
able facts that the area searched may have harbored a person posing danger).
244. Id. at 1097-98.
245. Id. at 1098. The Court in Buie limited the search, stating that the search
should extend only to where persons could be found and last no longer than is neces-
sary to dispel a reasonable suspicion of danger. Id. at 1099.
246. State v. Alayon, 459 N.W.2d 325, 330 (Minn. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 757
(1991).
247. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
248. 460 N.W.2d 614 (Minn. 1990).
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the same requirements. 249 The court held that evidence ob-
tained by a private security agency's search did not constitute
state action, and thus was not subject to the Fourth Amend-
ment even though the evidence was turned over to govern-




A. Limitations Period for Wrongful Discharge Claims
Employees discharged in violation of the Minnesota Human
Rights Act must file a civil action within one year "after the
occurrence of the practice."125' In Turner v. IDS Financial Serv-
ices, Inc.,252 the supreme court determined that, when the em-
ployer's "notice" of termination is received by the employee,
the statute of limitations begins to run on an unfair employ-
ment discrimination claim.253 In reversing the court of ap-
peals, the court relied on federal cases construing the parallel
Title VII language, "occurrence of the practice. "254
The plaintiff, a forty-eight-year-old division manager for the
defendant, was suspended from work pending an investigation
of allegations by coworkers that he had introduced an inappro-
priate religious atmosphere into the office.255 On February 4,
1987, the defendant notified the plaintiff that he would be ter-
minated on March 17, 1987.256 On January 8, 1988, the plain-
tiff brought a discrimination claim against the defendant,
249. State v. Buswell, 460 N.W.2d 614 (Minn. 1990), cert. denied, - S. Ct.
(1991).
250. See Brian L. Williams, Case Note, An Attack on Fourth Amendment Protection: Se-
curity Guards and the "Private" Search Doctrine-State v. Buswell, 18 WM. MrrCHELL L.
REV. - (1991).
251. MINN. STAT. § 363.06(3) provides in relevant part that
a claim of an unfair discriminatory practice must be brought as a civil action
pursuant to section 363.14, subdivision 1, clause (a), filed in a charge with a
local commission pursuant to section 363.116, or filed in a charge with the
commissioner within one year after occurrence of the practice.
MINN. STAT. § 363.06(3) (1990) (emphasis added).
252. 471 N.W.2d 105 (Minn. 1991).
253. Id. at 108.
254. Id. at 107-08.
255. Id. at 105.
256. Id. at 106.
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pursuant to the Minnesota Human Rights Act.25 7 The plaintiff
claimed that he was terminated because of his age and reli-
gious convictions.258
The plaintiff brought the discrimination suit more than 300
days after notice of discharge, but less than 300 days after ac-
tual termination.2 -9 The defendant took the position that the
300-day limitation period began when the plaintiff received no-
tice of discharge,260 thus precluding the plaintiff's suit. 26' The
court of appeals held that the statutory period commences on
the date of discharge.2 62  But the supreme court reversed,
holding that the statute of limitations begins running at the
time the notice of termination is received by the employee. 63
The majority adopted the United States Supreme Court's
approach to statute of limitation questions in Title VII
cases. 2 6 4 Two federal cases, Delaware State College v. Ricks265 and
Chardon v. Fernandez,266 construed the phrase "occurrence of
the practice" to mean the point at which the employer's dis-
criminatory act took place and not the point at which "the con-
sequences of the acts become most painful. ' 267  When an
employer gives pretermination notice, the discriminatory act
has been manifested, and the last day of employment becomes
257. MINN. STAT. § 363.03(1) provides in relevant part:
Except when based on a bona fide occupational qualification, it is an unfair
employment practice:
(2) For an employer, because of race, color, creed, religion, national origin,
sex, marital status, status with regard to public assistance, membership or
activity in a local commission, disability, or age,
(b) to discharge an employee
MINN. STAT. § 363.03(l)(2)(b) (1990).
258. Turner, 471 N.W.2d at 106.
259. See supra text accompanying notes 256-257.
260. Turner, 471 N.W.2d at 106.
261. In 1988 the limitation period was extended from 300 days to one year. MINN.
STAT. § 363.06(3) (1988).
262. See Turner v. IDS Fin. Serv. Inc., 459 N.W.2d 143, 149 (Minn. Ct. App.
1990).
263. Turner, 471 N.W.2d at 108.
264. Id. at 107-08.
265. 449 U.S. 250 (1980) (addressing denial of academic tenure because of na-
tional origin).
266. 454 U.S. 6 (1981) (addressing racial discrimination in the tenure decision).
267. The discriminatory act is the decision to terminate. The last day of employ-
ment is merely the final stage of the discriminatory act. See Chardon v. Fernandez,
454 U.S. 6, 8 (1981); Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 259 (1980).
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a mere consequence of the discharge decision. 268
The court supported its approach by comparing two dis-
charge scenarios. First, when an employer notifies an em-
ployee that discharge is to take place immediately, the
"practice" and "occurrence" are simultaneous and the statute
begins running at this point. 26 9 Second, Justice Simonett, writ-
ing for the majority, found that an indivisible "practice" and
"occurrence" takes place even when an employee's last work
day succeeds notice of termination:
The notice to terminate embodies the discriminatory deci-
sion, and the two together constitute the discriminatory act
or practice. In this time sequence, what happens on the
date of termination is seen more as a consequence of the
discriminatory act. Thus Chardon says, "the fact of termina-
tion is not itself an illegal act.".... It is the communicated
notice of termination that causes the employment to end;
and the fact that the last day of work ... is some days hence
makes the notice of termination no less effective.27 °
The court went on to conclude that the employee was pre-
cluded from bringing an action against his employer since the
300-day limitations period, which began on February 4, 1987,
had expired by the time he initiated suit the following
January.27
In Turner, the supreme court clarified the meaning of "occur-
rence of the practice" as it relates to the statutory period for
filing discriminatory discharge claims under the Minnesota
Human Rights Act. The ruling overturned Fitzgerald v. Norwest
Corp. 272 and placed Minnesota in line with most state jurisdic-
tions that have adopted the United States Supreme Court ap-
proach using notice of termination as the point at which the
statute of limitations period begins in employment discrimina-
268. Turner, 471 N.W.2d at 108.
269. Id. These are instances when the employee is terminated summarily; notice
is received through immediate termination.
270. Id. (quoting Chardon, 454 U.S. at 8).
271. Turner, 471 N.W.2d at 109 (YetkaJ., dissenting). Justice Yetka, with Justice
Gardebring, dissented, asserting three reasons for upholding the decision of the
court of appeals. Id. First, there may be instances in which an employer will reevalu-
ate its termination decision and decide to retain the employee. Second, a strict com-
pliance to the date of notice deadline will lead to harsh results on workers. Finally,
"an actual discharge date is a better bright-line rule to follow." Id.
272. 382 N.W.2d 290 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that limitations period on
plaintiff's age discrimination claim began to run upon discharge).
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tion cases.273
B. Judicial Review of School Board Employment Decisions
In Dokmo v. Independent School District #11,274 the court reaf-
firmed a long-held policy of reviewing school board decisions
exclusively through a certiorari petition to the court of ap-
peals. 275 In reversing a declaratory judgment in favor of a dis-
charged teacher, the court relied on the traditional doctrine of
separation of powers and practical reasons for limiting school
district employees to the writ mechanism. 276 Three members
of the court dissented, asserting that the question at hand
raised purely legal questions appropriately addressed by de-
claratory judgment.27 7
In 1983, Kristine Dokmo, a teacher with the Anoka-Henne-
pin school district, was granted a five-year extended leave of
absence, pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 125.60(2).278
During her leave, Dokmo moved to Le Sueur, Minnesota, and
accepted four consecutive one-year contracts as a long term
substitute art teacher for the Le Sueur school district.279 In
1987, Dokmo notified the Anoka-Hennepin school district that
she wished to return before the expiration of her extended
leave. 2
80
Upon discovering that she was employed as a teacher in Le
Sueur during her leave of absence, the Anoka-Hennepin
school district refused to reinstate Dokmo. The board argued
273. See, e.g., Ambrose v. Natomas Co., 202 Cal. Rptr. 217 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)
(holding that untimely action brought for termination of employment due to alleged
age discrimination was untimely); Quicker v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n, 747
P.2d 682 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987) (discussing discriminatory termination based on
handicap); St. Petersburg Motor Club v. Cook, 567 So. 2d 488 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1990) (discussing termination based on nepotism); Humphreys v. Riverside Mfg.
Co., 311 S.E.2d 223 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) (discussing alleged discrimination of a hand-
icapped individual suffering from cancer); Horn v. Human Rights Appeal Bd., 75
A.D.2d 978 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980) (discussing alleged sex discrimination); Independ-
ent Fire Co. v. W. Va. Human Rights Comm'n, 376 S.E.2d 612 (W. Va. 1988) (dis-
cussing suspension for endorsing a female for membership); Hilmes v. Department
of Industry, Labor and Human Relations, 433 N.W.2d 251 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) (dis-
cussing untimely filing of sexual discrimination complaint).
274. 459 N.W.2d 671 (Minn. 1990).
275. See infra notes 286-288 and accompanying text.
276. See infra notes 292-294 and accompanying text.
277. See infra notes 297-300 and accompanying text.
278. Dokmo, 459 N.W.2d at 672; see also MINN. STAT. § 125.60 (1990).




William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 8
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol18/iss1/8
MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT: 1990-1991
that her employment in Le Sueur violated her extended leave
agreement and, therefore, was a voluntary resignation. 28 '
Dokmo commenced a declaratory judgment action requesting
the Anoka County District Court to rule that she was a "substi-
tute" teacher with the Le Sueur school district and that she had
not violated her extended leave agreement.2 2 The trial court
found in favor of the plaintiff and ordered the district to rein-
state Dokmo.21s The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's
decision, reasoning that the school board's failure to grant
Dokmo a hearing justified the declaratory judgment. 2 4  The
supreme court reversed, holding that the trial court lacked ju-
risdiction to review a tenure decision of a school board. 28 5
Minnesota courts have long followed a policy of reviewing
school boards' teacher discharge decisions exclusively through
a writ of certiorari to an appellate court. 8 6 The policy has its
foundation in traditional notions of separation of powers be-
tween the judicial and legislative-administrative branches of
state government.28 7 Since a school board is legislative and
administrative in nature, and should be afforded deference in
its decisions, the judiciary should refrain from de novo re-
view. 28 If an appellate court grants certiorari, school board
281. Id.
282. The trial court declared that Dokmo was a "substitute teacher during her
leave and had not taken a 'full-time or part-time position as a teacher' " within the
meaning of MINN. STAT. § 125.60(6)(a) (1990). The trial court held that she had
waived any continuing contract rights as a substitute teacher under MINN. STAT.
§ 123.35(5) (1990). Dokmo, 459 N.W.2d at 673.
283. Id.
284. See Dokmo v. Independent Sch. Dist., 443 N.W.2d 231, 234 (Minn. Ct. App.
1989).
285. See Dokmo v. Independent Sch. Dist., 459 N.W.2d 671, 675 (Minn.
1990)("Use of declaratory judgments contravenes the standards this court has con-
sistently applied to school board decisions.").
286. See, e.g., Grinolds v. Independent Sch. Dist., 346 N.W.2d 123, 127 (Minn.
1984) (stating that teacher dismissals have historically been afforded appellate review
exclusively through writ of certiorari).
287. See, e.g., Whaley v. Anoka-Hennepin Indep. Sch. Dist., 325 N.W.2d 128, 130-
31 (Minn. 1982) (stating that separation of powers principles dictate a limited judicial
role in the application of substantial evidence with recognition that considerable judi-
cial deference should be extended to the factfinding processes of a school board).
288. Complete jurisdiction cannot, either directly or indirectly, be conferred
upon the courts in view of the constitutional division of the powers of gov-
ernment. . . .Yet a limited jurisdiction by way of certiorari, and in some
cases by statutory appeal, is conferred upon the courts. This is necessarily
confined to questions affecting the jurisdiction of the board, the regularity
of its proceedings, and, as to merits of the controversy, whether the order or
determination in a particular case was arbitrary, oppressive, unreasonable,
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decisions will be reversed only if the action was fraudulent, ar-
bitrary, unreasonable, unsupported by substantial evidence,
not within the board's jurisdiction, or based on an error of
law.2"9 Thus, the writ cannot be used to review factual deci-
sions of the board. 9 °
In reversing the court of appeals, the supreme court con-
cluded that Dokmo's pursuit of the declaratory judgment in
district court violated the certiorari procedure, which is care-
fully designed to preserve the separation of state power.29'
Chief Justice Popovich, writing for the majority, stated that
"declaratory judgment actions invite a de novo review by the
district courts. When declaratory judgment is used in place of
certiorari, the district court is not bound by the school board's
factual findings. 292 Accordingly, the court held that district
courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction over teacher ten-
ure and discharge decisions by school boards.293 Moreover,
the majority cited considerations of cost and time as practical
justifications for exclusive review through certiorari granted on
a discretionary basis. 94
The court further held that the court of appeals, upon a
grant of certiorari, will be restricted to "reviewing the school
board's record, whatever that record may be, regardless of whether
a hearing was provided below." 295 Hence, the court now disallows
district court review based on the failure of a school district to
provide a hearing for teachers challenging tenure decisions.29 6
Justice Wahl, joined by Justice Yetka and the Chief Justice,
filed a lengthy dissent.297 She argued that a district court's de-
fraudulent, under an erroneous theory of law, or without any evidence to
support it. A court cannot put itself in the place of the board, try the matter
de novo, and substitute its findings for those of the board.
State ex rel. Ging v. Board of Educ., 213 Minn. 550, 570-71, 7 N.W.2d 544, 556
(1942).
289. See, e.g., Foesch v. Independent Sch. Dist., 300 Minn. 478, 485, 223 N.W.2d
371, 375 (1974).
290. See Whaley v. Anoka-Hennepin Indep. Sch. Dist., 325 N.W.2d 128, 130-31
(Minn. 1982).
291. Dokmo v. Independent Sch. Dist., 459 N.W.2d 671, 675 (1990).
292. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 555.09 (1988)).
293. Dokmo, 459 N.W.2d at 677-78.
294. Id. at 677.
295. The court held that, although a record is essential for appellate court review,
there is no statutory requirement entitling a teacher to a hearing. Whaley, 325
N.W.2d. at 130-31.
296. Id. at 677.
297. See Dokmo, 459 N.W.2d at 678 (Wahl, J., dissenting).
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claratory judgment was proper under the facts of the case since
the action revolved around straightforward statutory interpre-
tation. 98 Justice Wahl did not view the district court's declara-
tory judgement as jeopardizing the boundaries separating
judicial and legislative/administrative functions.2 99 Indeed,
the dissent questioned the majority's seemingly unshakable
conclusion that certiorari has been uniformly recognized as the
exclusive route for those seeking judicial review over board
decisions.3 0 0
A comparison between the majority and dissent illustrates
diverging approaches to the preservation of separation of pow-
ers principles when reviewing administrative decisions. The
majority sees review by writ of certiorari as a carefully designed
procedure protecting the decisionmaking integrity of legisla-
tive/administrative bodies.3 0 ' Deviations from certiorari pro-
cedures, which the court recognizes as the exclusive avenue of
judicial review, will invariably lead to courts straying from lim-
ited review, and toward unwarranted interference with the deci-
sionmaking functions of school boards.3 0 2
On the other hand, the dissent, while acknowledging the
need to preserve the administrative decisionmaking powers of
school boards, would be more flexible and accommodating to
other review mechanisms.3 0 3 Justice Wahl does not see devia-
tion from certiorari procedure as necessarily jeopardizing
traditional notions of separation of powers.3° She, in effect,
advocates a case-by-case approach to determine whether the
particular avenue of judicial review unnecessarily interferes
with administrative powers of school boards. This debate inev-
itably will be continued in future supreme court cases review-
ing school board tenure decisions.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Justice Wahl cites prior decisions in which teacher declaratory judgment ac-
tions were entertained. Dokmo, 459 N.W.2d at 679 (Wahl J., dissenting); see also,
Sherek v. Independent Sch. Dist., 449 N.W.2d 434, 435 (Minn. 1990).
301. See supra notes 291-293 and accompanying text.
302. Id.
303. Cf Dokmo, 459 N.W.2d at 679 (Wahl, J., dissenting) (suggesting that school
board discharge decisions that raise purely legal inquiries should not be restricted to
judicial review by certiorari).
304. See supra note 299 and accompanying text.
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C. Veteran's Preference Act and Hiring Systems other than Civil
Service Systems
The Minnesota Veteran's Preference Act guarantees veter-
ans preference in public sector hiring on the state and local
level.3 1 5 In Hall v. City of Champlin, °6 the court clarified the
application of the act to state and local government. 0 7 The
court held that the statutory preferential point system applies
to all political subdivisions of the state, even though some
counties and municipalities may not utilize a civil service
system.
308
Jeffrey Hall, a disabled veteran within the meaning of Minne-
sota Statutes section 43A. 11(5), applied for a position as a la-
borer with the city of Champlin.30 9  The city gave no
preference to veterans in its hiring decisions and did not oper-
ate under a civil service system. After Hall was not hired for
the laborer position,31 0 he filed a complaint with the Commis-
sioner of Veteran Affairs requesting that the department en-
force his veteran's preference rights.3 ' An administrative law
judge ordered the city to comply with the Act, to adjust the
hiring process to accommodate the ten-point preferential
credit identified in the statute, and to hire Hall. 1 2 The court
of appeals affirmed.31 3 The supreme court granted review, ad-
dressing the city's assertion that, since 1975, the Act no longer
applies to political subdivisions that have adopted personnel
hiring systems other than the civil service. 1 4 Justice Wahl,
writing for the majority, held that veteran's preferences under
the 1975 law applies to all political subdivisions of the state
regardless of the hiring system they have adopted.31 5
305. MINN. STAT. § 43A. 11(1) (1990) provides: "recognizing that training and ex-
perience in the military services of the government and loyalty and sacrifice for the
government are qualifications of merit that cannot be readily assessed by examina-
tion, a veteran's preference shall be available pursuant to this section to a veteran as
defined in section 197.447." MINN. STAT. § 43A.1l(l) (1990).
306. 463 N.W.2d 502 (Minn. 1990).
307. See infra notes 315-318 and accompanying text.
308. Hall, 463 N.W.2d at 505 ("only a uniform policy applicable to all veterans
throughout the state can effect the intent of the legislature.").
309. Id. at 503.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 503.
313. See Hall v. City of Champlin, 450 N.W.2d 613, 617 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
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Although the provisions of section 43A. 11 make reference to
"competitive open examinations," seemingly indicating its ap-
plication to civil service, the court ascertained a clear legisla-
tive intent in Minnesota Statutes section 197.455316 to apply
section 43A. 11 to all state political subdivisions." 17 Moreover,
the court directed all subdivisions not operating under civil
service to adjust their hiring systems to accommodate the pref-
erence point scheme. 1 8
Hall v. City of Champlin holds tremendous clarification value
for public sector employment practitioners, as well as munici-
pal and county administrators. The court made it clear that,
despite confusing references to civil service mechanisms, the
Veteran's Preference Act applies with full force to all state,
county and municipal government.3 1 9 In addition, political
subdivisions have been put on notice that hiring practices and
procedures must conform to the legislative blueprint for vet-
eran's preferences.3 2 °
D. Veteran's Preference Act and Revocation of Veteran's Promotion
Although veterans enjoy significant employment protection
under section 197.46 of the Veteran's Preference Act, Minne-
sota courts have acknowledged that employment situations do
exist that fall outside of the provision's safeguards. In Ochocki
v. Dakota County Sheriff's Department,32' the Minnesota Supreme
Court held that promotions that violate a governmental en-
tity's internal hiring procedures will not be protected under
the Act. 22
Allen Ochocki, an honorably discharged veteran, received a
promotion to correctional team leader at the county jail.3 23
Several unsuccessful applicants successfully appealed the
county's Personnel Board of Appeals claiming that the promo-
316. See MINN. STAT. § 197.455 (1990).
317. The court concluded that the legislative intent underlying MINN. STAT.
§§ 43A. I1 and 197.455 is to grant preferential status to all veterans. Restricting ap-
plication to only those political subdivisions whose personnel policies operate under
the civil service would unduly narrow the obvious legislative intent. Hall, 463
N.W.2d at 504.
318. Id. at 505.
319. See supra notes 315-317 and accompanying text.
320. See supra note 318 and accompanying text.
321. 464 N.W.2d 496 (Minn. 1991).
322. Ochocki, 464 N.W.2d at 498.
323. Id. at 496.
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tion process was flawed. The County Board of Commissioners
set aside the promotions.124 Ochocki was not promoted fol-
lowing the second application process, and he petitioned the
Commissioner of Veteran's Affairs for reinstatement to correc-
tional team leader.
3 25
The administrative law judge determined that Ochocki's
prior promotion was protected by section 197.46 of the Vet-
eran's Preference Act.3 26 The court of appeals reversed, hold-
ing that the employee never acquired preference rights under
the Act due to flaws in the original hiring process, 3 27 and the
supreme court affirmed.
Minnesota courts have recognized three traditional excep-
tions to employment protection under the Veteran's Prefer-
ence Act. Those exceptions are incompetency,
3 28
misconduct,3 29 and the employer's good faith abolition of vet-
eran's position s.3 3 Additionally, the courts have held that cer-
tain employer practices are exempt from the Act because the
results of the practice, or underlying circumstances, are not the
types of practice that need protection under the Act. For ex-
ample, in Gorecki v. Ramsey County,33 t the Minnesota Supreme
Court held that the Act does not apply if the reclassification of
a position does not change the veteran's relative rank within
the employment system. 3 2
The supreme court acknowledged that the county's act of
setting aside the promotions and reopening the process could
not be categorized under one of the three traditional excep-
tions to the Act. 33 Instead, the court focused on the inapplica-
bility of the protections of the Veteran's Preference Act to
invalid promotions.334 Justice Wahl, writing for the court,
found parallels to the circumstances in Gorecki.335 The court
also was persuaded by an overriding policy of procedural fidel-
324. Id. at 497.
325. Id. at 497.
326. Id.; see MINN. STAT. § 197.46 (1990)
327. See Ochocki, 464 at 480.
328. See MINN. STAT. § 197.46 (1990).
329. See id.
330. See, e.g., State ex rel. Boyd v. Matson
(1923).
331. 437 N.W.2d 646, 650 (Minn. 1989).
332. Id.
333. See Ochocki v. Dakota County Sheri
334. Id. at 497.
335. Id.
155 Minn. 137, 141, 193 N.W. 30, 32
ff's Dept., 464 N.W.2d 496, 498 (1991).
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ity to the civil service system."3 6
The Ochocki decision gives practitioners a greater under-
standing of the appropriate role of veterans preference in pub-
lic employment. The policy underlying the Veteran's
Preference Act is to reward past military service personnel
through preferential hiring and to guarantee fair treatment on
the job. As Ochocki demonstrates, this policy has its limits.
Courts should not blindly invoke the protections of the Act if
the veteran cannot show harm or if the veteran is the benefici-




Spreigl evidence is evidence of a defendant's misconduct
other than the misconduct that is the subject of the trial. Such
evidence is admissible only if its probative value outweighs its
potential to unfairly prejudice the defendant.3 37 In State v. De-
Wald, 38 the Minnesota Supreme Court refined its definition of
the proper safeguards for the use of Spreigl evidence in a crimi-
nal trial. Although it upheld the conviction, the court en-
couraged trial courts in future cases to delay a final decision on
admissibility, even of permissible Spreigl evidence, 339 until the
probative force of all non-Spreigl evidence has been determined
by its actual use in court. In addition, the court recommended
336. Id. at 498 (citing State ex rel Kruse v. Webster 231 Minn. 309, 315-16, 43
N.W.2d 116, 120 (1950), overruled by Bahr v. City of Litchfield, 420 N.W.2d 604, 607
(Minn. 1988) (requirements of serving written notice of the results of the civil service
exam is unnecessary to the decision in Kruse)).
337. Even when the probative value of certain evidence is very high, Minnesota
courts have imposed additional procedural safeguards to minimize the risk of preju-
dice. Spreigl evidence takes its name from just such a case. See State v. Spreigl, 272
Minn. 488, 139 N.W.2d 167 (1965). Spreigl was a sexual abuse case in which the
prosecution, without notice to the defendant, introduced evidence of incidents of
alleged criminal sexual conduct by the defendant other than the incident for which he
was on trial. Id. at 489-90, N.W.2d at 168. The court reversed Spreigl's conviction,
holding that the state must, within a reasonable time before trial, present the defend-
ant with a written particularized statement of offenses the state intends to establish
against the defendant. Id. at 497, N.W.2d at 173.
338. 464 N.W.2d 500 (Minn. 1991).
339. Permissibility of Spreigl evidence is determined at an omnibus hearing prior
to trial. Dewald, 464 N.W.2d at 504; see MINN. R. CRIM. P. 11. This requirement
guards against prejudice to a defendant by providing a second opportunity for a trial
court to declare the evidence inadmissible.
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full pretrial hearings on the admissibility of Spreigl evidence. 4 °
DeWald was found guilty of the first-degree murder of
Marjorie Haugsrud."4 ' Much of the state's evidence, however,
referenced the murder of Walter Werdahl for which the de-
fendant was tried separately.342 The state justified the need for
Spreigl evidence during a pretrial offer of proof by asserting,
among other things,343 that direct evidence against DeWald for
the Haugsrud murder was weak.344 The trial court admitted
evidence of the Werdahl murder3 45 but gave the jury caution-
ary instructions on three occasions during trial.3 46
DeWald appealed for a new trial on the ground that the prej-
udicial impact of the Werdahl murder evidence outweighed its
probative value, thus rendering it inadmissible.34 7 Although
the court considered this a "troubling question, 53 48 it unani-
mously upheld the conviction:. 49 Nevertheless, the court rec-
ommended two additional procedural precautions for use in
cases involving Spreigl evidence: first, courts should schedule
full evidentiary hearings, rather than follow the procedure for
an offer of proof, to make an initial determination on admissi-
bility; second, courts should withhold a final decision on ad-
missibility until all the state's other evidence has been
presented at trial.350
340. DeWald, 464 N.W.2d at 505.
341. Id. at 501.
342. Id. at 502. DeWald was first tried for the Haugsrud murder, then was tried
and convicted for the Werdahl murder. The latter conviction was also affirmed on
appeal. See State v. DeWald, 463 N.W.2d 741 (Minn. 1990).
343. Even more fundamental than procedural issues is the question of whether
Spreigl evidence is admissible as an exception to the general rule prohibiting the use
of evidence of other crimes against a defendant. See MINN. R. EviD. 404(b). Spreigl
evidence may be admissible, "'to establish motive, intent, absence of mistake or acci-
dent, identity, or common scheme or plan.'" DeWald, 464 N.W.2d at 502-03 (quot-
ing State v. Slowinski, 450 N.W.2d 107, 113 (Minn. 1990)). The court examines this
issue in its inquiry into whether the offered evidence is relevant and material. This
requirement is satisfied if "the Spreigl offense [is] similar to the charged offense either
in time, location, or modus operandi." Id. at 503 (citing State v. Norris, 428 N.W.2d
61, 69 (Minn. 1988)).
344. DeWald, 464 N.W.2d at 504.
345. Id. at 502.
346. Id. at 505. The trial court cautioned the jury at the trial's commencement,
immediately before the presentation of the Spreigl evidence, and in the final
instructions.
347. Id. at 502.
348. Id. at 503-04.
349. Id. at 505.
350. Id. at 504-05.
[Vol. 18
44
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 8
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol18/iss1/8
MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT. 1990-1991
In Minnesota, the state must satisfy three requirements
before a court can admit Spreigl evidence."5 ' However, the
only real issue in DeWald was whether the potential for preju-
dice outweighed the probative value of the Spreigl evidence. 52
A Minnesota trial court may, to minimize the risk of unfair
prejudice, admit Spreigl evidence only if the state's direct or cir-
cumstantial evidence against the defendant is otherwise so
weak that the Spreigl evidence becomes "crucial to the state's
case."3 53 Where the probative weight and prejudicial potential
of evidence are nearly equal, courts must "pay particular
heed" to establishing the absolute necessity of the Spreigl evi-
dence before admitting that evidence. 54
While the court affirmed the conviction in this case, it never-
theless recognized that, in some cases, existing procedural
safeguards may be inadequate to ensure an accurate reading of
the strength of the state's direct and circumstantial evidence.
Indeed, DeWald was such a case. In DeWald, evidence that,
before trial, had appeared to be clearly insufficient to sustain
the state's burden of proof grew considerably more substantial
as the state presented its case at trial.3 55 Thus, the court rec-
351. First, there must be clear and convincing evidence that the defendant com-
mitted the Spreigl offense. Second, the Spreigl evidence must be relevant and material
to the present case. Third, the potential for unfair prejudice must not outweigh the
probative value of the Spreigl evidence. Id. at 503 (citing State v. Norris, 428 N.W.2d
61, 69 (Minn. 1988)). The court employed all three tests in evaluating whether the
trial court properly exercised its discretion in admitting the evidence. DeWald, 464 at
503. See supra note 343 for the court's evaluation of the relevance and materiality of
Spreigl evidence.
352. DeWald, 464 N.W.2d at 502. The prejudice versus probative value argument
is often the major issue in cases involving Spreigl evidence. See, e.g., State v. Spreigl,
272 Minn. at 488, 496, 139 N.W.2d 167, 172 (1965) (stating that in cases of this type,
evidence is excluded not because of too little probative value, but because of too
much) (quoting 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 193-94 (3rd ed. 1942)).
The court in DeWald was troubled by the danger inherent in the use of Spreigl
evidence; that is, that DeWald's conviction for the Haugsrud murder quite possibly
was based "solely on the Werdahl evideace." DeWald, 464 N.W.2d at 503-04.
353. DeWald, 464 N.W.2d at 504 (citing State v. Billstrom, 276 Minn. 174, 178,
149 N.W.2d 281, 284 (1967)).
354. DeWald, 464 N.W.2d at 504-05.
355. Id. at 504-05. The two items of evidence were a distinctive knife and the
defendant's partial fingerprint on the faucet. Before trial, the state stressed that De-
Wald's sister had recanted her identification of the knife and that the defendant may
have left a fingerprint during an earlier, consensual visit to the Haugsrud home.
However, at trial, DeWald's sister admitted that she recanted her identification only
after learning that the knife was going to be used as evidence against her brother.
The fingerprint, an expert testified, was almost certainly not from DeWald's earlier
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ommended two additional procedural safeguards.3 56 First,
357
where feasible in close cases, the trial court should "consider
... requiring" a more extensive evidentiary hearing prior to
trial.358 Second, the trial court should postpone any decision
to admit Spreigl evidence until after the state has presented all
its other evidence at trial. 359 At that point, the trial court is in
the best possible position to assess whether Spreigl evidence is
indeed "crucial" to the state's case.3"
The second of these two safeguards may significantly affect
future trials involving Spreigl evidence. Prosecutors will have
an incentive to disclose the full strength of their non-Spreigl ev-
idence during pretrial evidentiary hearings since they would
gain nothing from disguising the weight of this evidence.3 6 '
On the other hand, defense attorneys would gain a second and
more substantial opportunity to have Spreigl evidence declared
inadmissible.362
The underlying message of DeWald is unclear. The court ap-
parently does not favor any use of Spreigl evidence,3 63 and may
consensual visit. Moreover, the state presented additional evidence that the defend-
ant had lied by denying he knew Haugsrud or had visited her home. Id.
356. Id.
357. The court discussed this procedural suggestion second, but in a criminal pro-
ceeding, it will occur first in time. Id.
358. Id. at 505. The court avoided using mandatory language because the trial
court has broad discretion to determine whether to hold such a hearing. Id. (citing
State v. Lindahl, 309 N.W.2d 763, 766 (Minn. 1981)). The trial court in DeWald used
offer of proof procedure to evaluate the Spreigl evidence. The supreme court consid-
ered this choice of procedure proper, especially since the trial court also cautioned
the jury about the Spreigl evidence on three separate occasions during the trial. De-
Wald, 464 N.W.2d at 505.
359. Id. at 504.
360. Id. The court's choice of the adjective "crucial" may prompt a greater reluc-
tance to accept the validity of Spreigl evidence in the future. Compare id. with State v.
Slowinski, 450 N.W.2d 107, 114 (Minn. 1990) (defining "necessary"), State v. Bill-
strom, 276 Minn. 174, 178, 149 N.W.2d 281, 284 (1967) (defining "necessary").
361. Prosecutors would risk a mistrial by referring to Spreigl evidence during an
opening statement if that evidence was later ruled inadmissible. Thus, prosecutors
would benefit from a pretrial Spreigl evidence ruling which was based on an accurate
measurement of the strength of the state's non-Spreigl evidence.
362. The defense may assert at a pretrial hearing that Spreigl evidence is inadmissi-
ble because it is not clear and convincing. DeWald, 464 N.W.2d at 504; see MINN. R.
CRIM. P. 11, comment. However, the defense would be at cross purposes to contend
before trial that Spreigl evidence is inadmissible because the state had sufficient non-
Spreigl evidence to convict the defendant. The postponement until trial of a final
decision on admissibility extricates the defense from the horns of this dilemma.
363. See supra note 360; see also DeWald, 464 N.W.2d at 504 (stating that " 'Spreigl
evidence is admissible only if ... necessary' ") (quoting Billstrom, 276 Minn. at 178,
149 N.W.2d at 284 (emphasis added by the DeWald court)).
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reverse or even issue an outright acquittal, in a future convic-
tion involving Spreigl evidence.3 4 Yet the court unanimously
365 mutaathenxupheld the conviction in this case. We must await the next
case involving Spreigl evidence to fully discover the full effect of
DeWald in the area of Spreigl evidence.
B. Unsupervised Viewing of Videotape During Jury Deliberations
In State v. Kraushaar,3 66 the Minnesota Supreme Court con-
sidered whether the trial court committed reversible error by
sending a videotaped interview of a complaining witness to the
jury room. The court, with two justices dissenting, held that
the trial court's action in this case did not constitute reversible
error.
3 67
The case against Kraushaar began with allegations by his
former live-in companion that their four-year-old daughter,
M., told her of sexual misconduct by Kraushaar and exhibited
other aberrant behavior.3 68 After a social worker investigated,
M. was removed from Kraushaar's home and placed in a shel-
ter. When the shelter's foster mother had a similarly dis-
turbing conversation and noticed further aberrant behavior,
the social worker brought M. to Dr. Levitt, a pediatrician.369
Dr. Levitt gave M. a two-part examination. In the first part,
which was videotaped, 370 Dr. Levitt engaged M. in a nonlead-
364. The trial court's decision on Spreigl evidence may, in close cases, amount to
the difference between guilty and not guilty verdicts. The trial court must therefore
conclude whether the non-Spreig/ evidence sufficiently supports a guilty verdict. If
the court concludes that it does support such a verdict, and thus excludes Spreigi
evidence, the jury may disagree and acquit the defendant. On the other hand, if the
trial court decides non-Spreigl evidence is insufficient to convict and admits Spreigl
evidence, the supreme court may disagree and reverse the conviction.
365. The strong anti-Spreigl evidence tone of the opinions appears inconsistent
with the court's unanimous decision to affirm this conviction. There are at least three
possible explanations. First, perhaps the court is using language that indicates a
stronger revulsion toward Spreigl evidence than the court actually holds. Second,
perhaps in a close case, the combination of trial court discretion on this issue and
frequent jury instructions suffice to justify affirming a conviction. Third, perhaps the
court intends (without directly stating) that its new approach to Spreigl evidence is
prospective only.
366. 470 N.W.2d 509 (Minn. 1991).
367. Id. at 516.
368. Id. at 510-11. The other behavior included drawings of stick people with
genitalia, and asking her mother to "play with her butt."
369. Id. at511.
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ing conversation by means of anatomical drawings. The sec-
ond part involved light touching of a child's genital area and
accompanying nonleading questions. Dr. Levitt testified about
both examinations, and the videotape was introduced into evi-
dence,3 7 ' viewed at trial, and then reviewed after the jury re-
quested and received a television set during deliberations. 72
The trial court convicted Kraushaar of second degree crimi-
nal sexual conduct.3 7 3 The court of appeals reversed the con-
viction on three grounds, 3 74 but dealt primarily with the
propriety of allowing the jury to view the videotape in the jury
room.
3 75
Under Minnesota law, a jury may "take into the jury room
exhibits which have been received in evidence.., except depo-
sitions."'3 76 If the challenged evidence is similar to a deposi-
tion, it comes within the exception to the general rule, and the
jury may examine it only after being conveyed back to the
courtroom. However, if the challenged evidence is unlike a
deposition, the evidence is permitted into the jury room under
the general rule. A violation of the rule is not grounds for re-
versal if the reviewing court considers it harmless error,377 and
the trial court has broad discretion in this area.378
The question thus was whether the challenged evidence was
similar to a deposition as defined by the rules. The majority in
Kraushaar decided that the videotaped interview was not suffi-
ciently similar to a deposition, and thus did not fall under the
rule's exception.3 7 ' The word "deposition," the court noted,
has a specialized meaning under the procedural rules.38° In
371. Id. During cross examination, Dr. Levitt testified that she relies 90 percent
on her interaction with the child in determining whether sexual abuse has occurred.
372. State v. Kraushaar, 459 N.W.2d 346, 348 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
373. Kraushaar, 470 N.W.2d at 510.
374. The three grounds were insufficient evidence, lack of foundation for an ex-
pert's testimony, and trial court error in allowing Dr. Levitt's videotape to be viewed
in the jury room. Id.; see Kraushaar, 459 N.W.2d 346.
375. Kraushaar, 470 N.W.2d at 513. Justices Tomljanovich and Simonett wrote
separate dissenting opinions, though Justice Simonett joined Justice Tomljanovich's
opinion. The two justices disagreed with the majority only on the videotape issue.
Id. at 517-18 (Tomljanovich and Simonett, J.J., dissenting).
376. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.03, subd. 19(1).
377. See State v. Rean, 421 N.W.2d 303, 305-07 (Minn. 1988); State v. Kindem,
338 N.W.2d 9, 16-17 (Minn. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 974 (1984).
378. State v. Daniels, 332 N.W.2d 172, 177 (Minn. 1983).
379. Krautshaar, 470 N.W.2d at 515.
380. Id. A "deposition" under the rules of criminal procedure is one taken to
preserve evidence from a witness likely to be unavailable at trial. The rationale for its
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the majority's view, the videotape was not similar to a deposi-
tion, and thus was allowed by the general rule.3 8 '
The precedential value of Kraushaar, if not subsequently lim-
ited, 8 2 is quite harmful to defendants in criminal cases. The
jury in Kraushaar was allowed more liberties with an out-of-
court interview of the victim than juries are allowed with actual
courtroom testimony.38 3 In future cases, defense attorneys
should object to any request or decision that an audiotape or
videotape go to the jury room. The attorney may not get the
chance to object later if the jury asks for a device to play the
tape. 8 4 Prosecutors and trial courts, meanwhile, will risk fu-
ture reversals of convictions if they rely upon Kraushaar instead
of ensuring that the jury review such evidence in the
exclusion was to avoid having the jury give greater weight or closer analysis to this
written evidence than it would to the witnesses who actually testified. See MINN. R.
CRIM. P. 21 and comment.
381. Kraushaar, 470 N.W.2d at 515. The majority noted a similar issue, discussion,
and resolution in a Minnesota civil case. See Adrian v. Edstrom, 304 Minn. 52, 59,
229 N.W.2d 161, 166 (1975) (allowing transparency with figures, which was admitted
into evidence, into jury room).
382. The court in Kraushaar noted that the trial court should properly have con-
veyed the jury to the courtroom to view the videotape, then held that any error in this
regard was harmless. Id. at 516. A future decision might hold that this part of Kraus-
haar puts trial courts on notice, and may regard future similar errors as prejudicial.
There is no way to justify the holding of Kraushaar on any other basis. See infra note
383.
383. If the jury wishes to review trial testimony or other evidence the court must
notify counsel and conduct the jury to the courtroom. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.03, subd.
19(2). The videotape itself could be considered an exhibit, which could go to the
jury room. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.03, subd 19(1). However, by allowing the jury to
view the videotape by supplying a television, the trial court, and the supreme court
majority, applied the wrong rule-the videotape was no longer merely an exhibit,
and should have been treated like a trial transcript.
The special definition of "deposition" in criminal cases is not relevant. See supra
note 380. Even a conventional deposition would not go to the jury-in fact, it is not
used as substantive evidence, but only for impeachment. Indeed, the rationale for
excepting depositions in criminal cases from treatment as exhibits applies perfectly
to a videotaped out-of-court interview.
The cases the majority relied upon as precedents come under exceptions to the
general rule against al!owing jury room review of testimonial materials. See State v.
Barbo, 339 N.W.2d 905 (Minn. 1983) (allowing jury to hear in jury room tape of
incriminating telephone conversation); State v. Gensmer, 235 Minn. 72, 81, 51
N.W.2d 680, 686 (1951) (holding audiotape is mechanized version of defendant's
longhand statement, which trial court could send to jury room), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
824 (1952). See also EDWARD CLEARY ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 217 (student
ed. 1984).
384. See Kraushaar, 470 N.W.2d at 516 (attorney did not object to tape being
placed in evidence or to sending it to jury room).
19921
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courtroom. 8 5
C. Child Sexual Abuse and the Confrontation Clause
In State v. Lanam, 386 the Minnesota Supreme Court consid-
ered whether admitting into evidence a non-testifying child's
out-of-court statements violates the defendant's right to con-
front witnesses.387 The court, with three justices dissenting,388
held that the defendant's confrontation right is not violated
when the trial court finds that the child witness is incompetent
to testify and the out-of-court statements are sufficiently
reliable.389
On May 2, 1988, Sharon Carlson, a foster parent, overheard
S., a three-year-old girl, say that someone had touched S.'s
genital area. Carlson asked S. about this, and S. told Carlson
how "David" 9 ' had abused her while babysitting. Later, S.
demonstrated the abuse, using anatomically correct dolls, to a
police officer and a social worker. 39  A medical examination
the next day confirmed that S. had been abused. 92 S. gave
information sufficient to identify David Lanam as the perpetra-
tor of the abuse. 93 Lanam was convicted of first degree crimi-
nal sexual conduct, and the court of appeals affirmed the
conviction. 94
A defendant in Minnesota has the right, under both federal
and state constitutions, to confront witnesses against him.
3 95
Since the texts of the federal and state constitutional provi-
385. See id. at 516 (jury should have viewed in courtroom, but not prejudicial er-
ror). Kraushaar puts trial courts on notice; in any future case, the supreme court may
decide that such an error is not harmless.
386. 459 N.W.2d 656 (Minn. 1990).
387. Id. at 658.
388. Id. at 662-68 (KelleyJ., dissenting). ChiefJustice Popovich andJustice Yetka
joined in this dissent.
389. Id. at 661-62.
390. There was an issue over which "David" might have abused S., but that issue
was resolved at trial. Id. at 657-58. The supreme court held that the evidence was
sufficient to sustain Lanam's conviction. Id. at 662.
391. Id. at 657.
392. Id. S.'s hymen was scarred and her vaginal opening was enlarged. The doc-
tor "ruled out any disease or other condition as possible causes." Id.
393. Id. at 657-58. S. said that "David" abused her while babysitting at her
mother's house and worked at Pizza Hut (she called all pizza makers "Pizza Hut").
Lanam had babysat her and worked at Domino's Pizza. S. also pointed out "David's"
house and identified him in the courthouse hall when they accidentally met. Id.
394. Id. at 657.
395. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 6.
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sions are "substantially identical," the state has relied on fed-
eral cases in defining the extent of a defendant's right of
confrontation. s 96
The United States Supreme Court recently held that hearsay
statements do not violate the right of confrontation if the de-
clarant is unavailable and the statement is sufficiently relia-
ble. 97 The Court stated that a child in a case involving
criminal sexual conduct can be considered an unavailable wit-
ness for purposes of a confrontation clause analysis.3 98 How-
ever, a witness is not unavailable unless the state has made a
"good faith effort" to have the witness testify. 99 Moreover,
the reliability of the statements is determined by whether, in
the totality of the circumstances, it is "particularly likely" that
the declarant's statements were truthful when made.0° Min-
nesota, by statute, allows for the admissibility of hearsay state-
ments of a child under ten years of age if the statement is
reliable, and, if the child is unavailable, evidence exists to cor-
roborate the statement. Under the same statute, an incompe-
tent witness is considered unavailable.40 '
The Lanam court noted that the prosecution, not the de-
fense, made the effort to have S. declared competent to testify.
This qualified as a good faith effort to produce the witness,40 2
thus allowing the court to declare S. an unavailable witness for
purposes of confrontation clause analysis.40 3 The court then
examined whether S.'s out-of-court statements were relia-
ble.4 ' 4 The court noted that S. first spoke about the abuse
spontaneously to other children, and her story remained basi-
396. 459 N.W.2d at 663 (Kelley, J., dissenting). Justice Kelley's dissenting opin-
ion argued, extensively and eloquently, but unsuccessfully, for a more expansive in-
terpretation of the confrontation right under the Minnesota constitution. Id. at 663-
66 (Kelley, J., dissenting).
397. Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1988).
398. Id. at 3147.
399. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 74-75 (1980).
400. Id. at 3149-50. The Court in Wright rejected the argument that a child's out-
of-court statement is per se unreliable if the trial court later determines that the child
is incompetent to testify at a trial. Id. at 3151-52.
401. MINN. STAT. § 595.02, subd. 3 (1990). The defendant did not challenge the
statute. State v. Lanam, 459 N.W.2d 656, 659 (Minn. 1990).
402. Lanam, 459 N.W.2d at 659. The court noted that the prosecution "clearly
wanted" S. to testify, while the defendant did not object to the trial court's finding
that S. was incompetent. Id.
403. Id. The court did not decide whether the general requirement of unavailabil-
ity applied to hearsay statements of children.
404. Id. at 659-61.
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cally the same thereafter. Moreover, S. had neither a motive to
malign Lanam nor to make up a story. Indeed, one would not
expect a child of S.'s age to make up such a story. Considering
the totality of the circumstances, the court concluded that S.'s
statements were "sufficiently reliable for confrontation clause
purposes."
40 5
After Lanam, confrontation clause challenges in similar cases
likely will focus only on the issue of the reliability of the child's
statements. Prosecutors must merely make a good faith effort
to have the child declared competent. If this effort fails, any
reliable statements that the child has made are insulated from
reversal on confrontation clause grounds.40 6 After Lanam, un-
availability for statutory purposes is also equated with unavail-
ability for constitutional purposes in child sexual abuse cases.
D. DNA Typing and Population Frequency Statistics
In State v. Nielsen, 40 7 the court examined the use of DNA typ-
ing as evidence. The court found no prejudicial error in the
trial court's approach in Nielsen,4 °8 but cautioned trial courts to
continue to honor reasonable defense requests for evidentiary
hearings on the admissibility of DNA tests.40 9
Nielsen was convicted of first degree felony murder.41 0
Among the evidence supporting this conviction 41 ' was a DNA
405. Id. at 661. Indeed, one additional factor in the totality of the circumstances
was the medical examination which strongly indicated that S. had been sexually
abused. Id. at 657.
406. By contrast, if the defense attempts to have a child witness declared compe-
tent, and the prosecution objects, the court will review a trial court finding of incom-
petency. Id.
407. 467 N.W.2d 615 (Minn. 1991).
408. Id. at 619.
409. Id. at 619-20. The court left open the question of a separation of powers
violation from a legislative rule on the admissibility of evidence. See MINN. STAT.
§ 634.26 (1990) (authorizing admissibility of statistical population frequency evi-
dence relative to DNA results); State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 429 n.6 (Minn.
1989).
410. Nielsen, 467 N.W.2d at 617. First degree felony murder is causing death
while committing or attempting felonious sexual conduct with force or violence.
MINN. STAT. § 609.185(2) (1990). Nielsen was also convicted of second degree mur-
der but was sentenced only on the more serious charge.
411. The other evidence included testimony that he was the last person seen with
the victim before her death, blood found in his car, blood on his shirt that matched
the victim's blood, his black eye the next day (and his conflicting explanations for it),
leaving town after learning the police wanted to speak with him, and a dubious claim
that he dropped the victim off at a gas station (which was closed at the time). Nielsen,
467 N.W.2d at 619.
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test indicating that the semen found in Shelly Pavlacky's body
was Nielsen's.4 1 2 On appeal, Nielsen contended that the killing
and the rape were not sufficiently connected to justify a first
degree felony murder conviction.41 3 However, the court held
that the jury had sufficient evidence to find the necessary con-
nection.4 14 In this context, the admissibility of DNA test re-
sults in this case was not an issue of primary importance.41 5
Nevertheless, the court used this opportunity to clarify current
Minnesota law on DNA evidence.41 6
In Nielsen, the court noted the future possibility that some
laboratory would meet all guidelines and thus obviate founda-
tion issues. In the interim, however, the court cautioned trial
courts to honor every reasonable defense request for a hearing
on the reliability of any particular DNA test analysis.41 7 In ad-
dition, the court sounded ominous warnings about separation
of powers problems with legislative attempts to overrule Min-
nesota caselaw on the issue.418 Resolution of this inter-branch
dispute likely will occur in a future case.4 19
412. Id.
413. Id. Nielsen's story was that he killed the victim during a fight that she initi-
ated by screaming at him while his car was parked. During the fight, Nielsen throt-
tled her, then he asserted that he drove around looking for police, but one-half hour
later decided to rape the corpse. Id. at 617.
414. Nielsen, 467 N.W.2d at 619.
415. Id. at 619 (concluding that any error involving testimony on DNA was harm-
less due to overwhelming evidence against defendant). In addition, Nielsen's own
account admitted the rape. Id. at 617-18.
416. Id. at 619-20. State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422 (Minn. 1989), is the most
recent Minnesota case dealing in depth with the issue of the DNA-related evidentiary
issues. The court in Schwartz held that DNA test evidence is generally acceptable. Id.
at 426. However, the court held that the DNA evidence in that case was inadmissible
because the particular testing laboratory neither met minimum testing standards nor
gave the defendant the opportunity for independent review of the data and results.
Id. at 428. The laboratory that was unreliable in Schwartz also performed the DNA
tests at issue in Nielsen. Nevertheless, the court in Nielsen noted that this evidence was
presented at trial before Schwartz was filed, and further held that any possible error
was harmless in any event. Nielsen, 467 N.W.2d at 619. In addition, the court in
Schwartz reaffirmed earlier cases that limited prosecutors' use of population fre-
quency statistics on DNA types. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d at 428. See State v. Joon Kyu
Kim, 398 N.W.2d 544 (Minn. 1987). As Justice Kelley noted with displeasure in
Schwartz, Minnesota is the only jurisdiction with this limitation. 447 N.W.2d at 428
(Kelley, J., concurring). See State v. Joon Kyu Kim, 398 N.W.2d 544 (Minn. 1987);
State v. Boyd, 331 N.W.2d 480 (Minn. 1983).
417. Nielsen, 467 N.W.2d at 619-20.
418. Id. at 620.
419. The court avoided this issue in Schwartz, despite Justice Kelley's urging, be-
cause the case did not present the issue. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d at 429 n.6. While the
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E. Blood-Spatter Interpretation
In State v. Moore,42 ° the Minnesota Supreme Court consid-
ered, for the first time, whether the scientific community gen-
erally accepts the reliability of blood spatter interpretation.4 2 t
Although the court reversed the conviction in this case on
other grounds,4 22 the court also held that the state sufficiently
established general scientific acceptance of blood spatter
analysis.423
On November 11, 1988, Debra Moore, defendant Eugene
Moore's wife, was shot and killed in the living room of their
house. At trial, Eugene claimed that Debra had taken a shot-
gun to shoot him but, following a struggle, she somehow shot
herself.4 2 4 The state presented a blood spatter interpretation
expert who testified that the blood spatter pattern indicated
that Debra could not have been standing at the time she was
shot.4 2 5 This evidence on the victim's posture severely under-
cut Eugene Moore's version of events.426 The jury found him
guilty of both first and second degree murder, as well as sec-
issue was before the court in Nielsen, it was largely moot since, in the court's opinion,
any error on this issue was harmless. Nielsen, 467 N.W.2d at 619.
420. 458 N.W.2d 90 (Minn. 1990).
421. The court had implicitly accepted the reliability of blood spatter evidence in
at least five cases before Moore. See infra note 432.
422. The court ordered a new trial because the defense attorney made an unau-
thorized admission of Moore's quilt during closing argument. Moore, 458 N.W.2d at
95-96. In addition, the jury returned legally inconsistent verdicts, finding Moore
guilty of both first degree murder (which requires intent to cause death) and second
degree manslaughter (which requires recklessness but not intent to cause death).
The court found these verdicts legally inconsistent because "one cannot premeditate
and intend to be culpably negligent in causing the death of another." Id. at 93-94.
While MINN. STAT. § 611.02 (1990) resolves the problem of legally inconsistent ver-
dicts by directing conviction for the lesser offense, in Moore, even the conviction for
the second degree manslaughter was questionable because of the defense attorney's
admission. The court ordered a new trial as the only fitting remedy. Moore, 458
N.W.2d at 95.
423. Id. at 98.
424. Id. at 92. Eugene's story was inconsistent before trial. An hour after the
shooting, he told a telephone operator who recorded the conversation that he had
shot his wife after an argument. His three statements to the police differed on
whether Debra or he pulled the trigger, though in all three he insisted the shooting
was accidental. Id.
425. Id. at 93. The expert, Gary Kaldun, opined that Debra Moore's chest was two
feet off the living room floor when she was shot.
426. Id. at 96. Indeed, even the defense attorney apparently felt a need, during
his summation, to explain how and why Debra ended up two feet off the ground
when she was shot. His explanation required admitting that the defendant pulled the
trigger, although without intent. The court sympathized with the attorney's di-
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ond degree manslaughter.4 27
Minnesota courts employ a two-part inquiry for evaluating
whether a proper foundation has been laid for the admissibility
of the results of a scientific test. First, the test must be gener-
ally accepted within the scientific community and, thus, relia-
ble. Second, the administration of that test in the case at hand
must conform to a generally reliable procedure. 42' The trial
court has discretion to resolve both foundational issues.4 29
The Moore court devoted most of its discussion to whether
blood spatter analysis is generally reliable. Although, the
court had not faced this issue directly in any prior case,430 the
court held that the state had sufficiently established the general
reliability of blood spatter evidence in this case.43 '
The court based its holding on a number of factors. First, in
at least five previous Minnesota cases, the court has " 'implic-
itly accept[ed] the general reliability' " of blood spatter analy-
sis. 4 32 Second, the defendant produced no expert testimony to
refute the prosecution's evidence on the general reliability of
blood spatter analysis. Third, other jurisdictions have not re-
quired an elaborate foundation before holding blood spatter
analysis generally reliable. And fourth, unlike novel ap-
proaches such as DNA testing, blood spatter analysis applies
established, reliable scientific principles.433
The court in Moore did not clearly state that blood spatter
lemma, yet held that this unauthorized admission (the defendant strongly objected
during the summation) warranted a new trial. Id. at 95-96.
427. Id. at 93. The verdicts were legally inconsistent. See supra note 422.
428. Moore, 458 N.W.2d at 98 (quoting State v. Dille, 258 N.W.2d 565, 567 (Minn.
1977)).
429. Id. (quoting State v. Bott, 310 Minn. 331, 334, 246 N.W.2d 48, 51 (1976)).
430. Id. at 97.
431. Moore, 458 N.W.2d at 98.
432. Id. at 97 (quoting State v. Fenney, 448 N.W.2d 54, 58, n.1. (Minn. 1989)). In
all five cases, blood-spatter analysis helped reconstruct a crime scene. See State v.
Merrill, 428 N.W.2d 361, 370 (Minn. 1988) (finding that victim was either on the
floor or helplessly tipped in a wheelchair); State v. Norris, 428 N.W.2d 61, 68 (Minn
1988) (showing direction of bullet); State v. Robinson, 427 N.W.2d 217, 226 (Minn.
1988) (refuting defendant's contention that he transported victim in wheelchair only
after killing victim in self-defense); State v. Gibbons, 305 N.W.2d 331, 334 (Minn.
1981) (establishing victim's position on or near couch); State v. Malzac, 309 Minn.
330, 306, 244 N.W.2d 258, 262 (1976) (indicating victim's proximity to front seat of
car).
433. Moore, 458 N.W.2d at 97 n.6. According to the expert testimony in this case,
bloodspattering follows the laws of physics, resulting in measurable mathematical
correlations between the length and width of the spatters. Id. at 97.
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analysis is generally reliable. The court held only that the state
sufficiently established its reliability in this case.4" 4 As a result,
in future cases, the state still must make some showing of the
general scientific reliability of this analysis. Nevertheless, after
Moore, a defendant's challenge to the general reliability of
blood spatter analysis will almost certainly be futile.
John D. Becker
VIII. FAMILY LAW
A. Statute of Limitations for Defense of Nonpaternity
In a dissolution and support action, a putative father is not
barred by the statute of limitations from claiming the defense
of nonpaternity. In Reynolds v. Reynolds,4"' the Minnesota
Supreme Court held that when the issue of nonpaternity is
used as a defense to another's action, the statute of limitations
should not bar a defense of nonpaternity.
The action began when Corrine M. Reynolds brought suit
against Michael R. Reynolds to dissolve their marriage.436 In
addition, she sought support for two children born during the
marriage.4" 7 The defendant denied paternity, claiming he
could not be the biological father of the two children because
he had a successful vasectomy before he married the plain-
tiff.4"' The plaintiff later acknowledged that the defendant was
not the biological father of the children, but she asserted that
he had forced her to have sexual relations with third parties so
that he could have children with her.439 The trial court dis-
solved the marriage440 but reserved the issue of paternity for
future determination.
When a subsequent blood test verified that the defendant
was not the children's biological father, the defendant moved
434. Id. at 98.
435. 458 N.W.2d 103 (Minn. 1990).
436. Reynolds v. Reynolds, 454 N.W.2d 271, 272 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
437. Both parties had children from previous marriages. Corrine sought child
support only for two children born during the marriage. Id.
438. A test in 1984 confirmed that the vasectomy had been successful. Reynolds,
458 N.W.2d at 104.
439. Id. Blood tests taken subsequently confirmed that two brothers were the bio-
logical fathers of the two children. Id.
440. The action to dissolve the marriage was brought in October 1984. The mar-
riage was finally dissolved in 1986. Reynolds, 454 N.W.2d at 273.
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to terminate his child support payments.44 ' In response, the
plaintiff asserted that a three-year statute of limitations barred
the defendant from claiming nonpaternity. 442 The trial court
held that the three-year statute of limitations "did not prevent
Michael from claiming nonpatemity in defense to someone
else's action against him."' 443 The court of appeals reversed
the trial court444 and the supreme court reversed the court of
appeals' holding that the statute of limitations should not bar a
party from raising nonpaternity as a pure defense.445
The Reynolds decision is strictly in accord with the general
rule that the statute of limitations "may be used as a shield,
and not a sword. ' 44 6 Under Minnesota common law, a claim
raised in defense generally will be permitted, despite the run-
ning of a statute of limitations. 447 However, the same claim, if
made as an independent action, would be barred by the appli-
cable statute of limitations.
B. Interference with Custodial Rights
The court, in Larson v. Dunn,44 considered whether a custo-
dial parent may sue a non-custodial parent for interfering with
the custodial parent's rights. This issue has been a trouble-
some one for the Minnesota courts and legislature. 449 The
Larson court declined to recognize such a cause of action, stat-
ing that to do so would "create a new burden on children who
are already dislocated by the dissolution of their parents'
marriage. "450
Ping Wang
441. Reynolds, 458 N.W.2d at 104.
442. MINN. STAT. § 257.57(1)(b) (1990).
443. Reynolds, 458 N.W.2d at 104.
444. The court of appeals based its decision on Johnson v. Hunter, 447 N.W.2d
871 (Minn. 1989) (holding that daughter was not precluded from bringing paternity
action against putative father).
445. Reynolds, 458 N.W.2d at 104.
446. Id. at 105.
447. Household Finance Corp. v. Pugh, 288 N.W.2d 701, 703 (Minn. 1980) (citing
Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247 (1935) and C. Aultman & Co. v. Torrey, 55 N.W.
211 (1893)).
448. 460 N.W.2d 39 (Minn. 1990).
449. For a full discussion of Larson v. Dunn, see Sharon McDonnell Dobbs, Case
Note, Tort Recovery for Intentional Interference with Custodial Rights in Minnesota, 17 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1159 (1991).
450. 460 N.W.2d at 45.
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IX. INSURANCE
A. Definition of "Professional Services"
When a professional is sued by a patient or client, the pro-
fessional normally turns to a malpractice insurer for defense
and indemnity. In St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Love, 4 5 '
the Minnesota Supreme Court expanded the definition of
"professional services" covered by insurance to include con-
sensual sexual relations between a psychologist and a
patient.
452
While giving marriage counseling, Dr. Love 453 engaged in
sexual relations with a female patient.454 The patient and hus-
band brought suit against the psychologist for negligence and
malpractice.455 The psychologist turned the complaint over to
his malpractice insurer, St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Com-
pany, under the provisions of his insurance contract, in which
the insurer had stated, "We'll pay amounts you're legally re-
quired to pay for damages resulting from.., professional serv-
ices that you provided or should have provided. ' 456  The
insurer commenced a declaratory action against Love, denying
coverage of the claim on the basis that the patient's damages
had not been sustained while providing professional
services.45
The scope of "professional services" had been previously
visited by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Smith v. St. Paul Fire
& Marine Insurance Co.458 In Smith, a medical doctor had taken
sexual advantage of three small boys.459 The Smith court held
that the scope of "professional services" was limited to "medi-
451. 459 N.W.2d 698 (Minn. 1990).
452. Id.
453. Dr. Love practiced "in the areas of marital therapy and behavior modifica-
tion." Id. at 699.
454. According to Dr. Love, the patient became "flirtatious" soon after counsel-
ing began. According to the patient, she thought that the psychologist liked her and
that therefore she had to be sexual. Id.
455. The patient also sought recovery for breach of contract and infliction of emo-
tional distress. Id.
456. Id. at 699.
457. Id.
458. 353 N.W.2d 130 (Minn. 1984).
459. Smith differs procedurally from Love in that, in Smith, the three boys brought
the declaratory action against the malpractice insurer of the doctor, requesting that
the insurer cover the claim of the doctor. Id. at 13 1. In Love, the malpractice insurer
sought a declaratory judgment arguing that it, the insurer, should not be forced to
cover the claim. Love, 459 N.W.2d at 699.
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cal treatment of physical ailments."46 The doctor's sexual
conduct had not involved "medical treatment of physical ail-
ments." Therefore, the insurer could not be forced to cover a
claim resulting from nonmedical conduct.
46'
Despite this precedent, the court distinguished Smith
because the common psychological phenomena of "transfer-
ence" and "countertransference" had occurred.462 Trans-
ference occurs where the patient projects onto the therapist
feelings belonging to some significant past figure, such as a
parent.463 Countertransference occurs when the therapist
transfers his or her own problems to the patient. When
transference occurs, medical ethics require that the therapist
overcome those feelings and explain them to the patient.
465 If
the therapist cannot overcome the feelings, the therapist must
discontinue the professional relationship.
466
Although both medical and legal authorities recognize that
mishandling of the transference phenomenon constitutes mal-
practice,467 the question presented in Love was whether the in-
surer was required to cover the doctor's claim. In an opinion
by Justice Simonett, the court held that the sexual aspect of the
therapist's conduct was "inextricably" intertwined with the
professional services provided.468 Due to transference, the
sexual conduct was due to mishandling of a recognized psy-
chological phenomenon and was therefore related to the ther-
apy services. 4 6 ' The court distinguished Smith, where the
sexual conduct was not related to the medical services pro-
vided. Thus, the sexual conduct was professional conduct cov-
ered by the insurance policy.
4 70
In a strong dissent, Justice Coyne noted that the scope of the
insurance coverage depended on the intent of the parties. She
460. Smith, 353 N.W.2d at 132.
461. Id.
462. Love, 459 N.W.2d at 699.
463. Id. at 700.
464. Id.
465. Id.
466. Id. at 700 n. 1. (citing Phyllis Coleman, Sex Between Psychiatrist and Former Pa-
tient: A Proposal for a "No Harm, No Foul" Rule, 41 OKLA. L. REV. 1 (1988)).
467. Id. (citation omitted).
468. Love, 459 N.W.2d at 701.
469. Id. The professional services rendered here required the therapist "to enter
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argued that the vulnerability of the patient to transference,
although compelling, is not significant and should not be con-
sidered.4 7' Neither the insurer nor the insured could have in-
tended that coverage should allow a therapist to step out of the
professional role and intentionally engage in sexual conduct
with a patient.472 The only means for an insurer to guard
against an expanded definition of "professional services"
would be to write a policy that specifically precludes coverage
for transference and any other wrongful act which might be
related to professional services.4 7 s
Beyond its impact on insurers, the Love decision sends a dan-
gerous signal to those professionals who are entrusted with the
lives of others. An incentive is thereby created for profession-
als to lessen their vigilance against improper conduct. Profes-
sionals, whether they be doctors, lawyers or clergy, now have a
precedent on which to argue for indemnification of intentional
wrongdoing. The case signals to professionals that inten-
tional, wrongful conduct may be excused.
B. Notice of a Request for Subrogation
An insurer in Minnesota has an equitable right to subroga-
tion.474 The right of subrogation arises, for example, when an
insured (Party No. 1) is injured in an automobile accident and
the other party to the accident (Party No. 2) is underinsured.
The right of subrogation accrues to the insurer of Party No. 1,
who is forced to pay benefits which otherwise would have been
paid by Party No. 2's insurer. Party No. l's insurer may then
bring suit against Party No. 2 to recover this difference.
A problem arises when Party No. 1 settles with Party No. 2's
insurer without notifying its insurer that the suit is about to be
settled. The court in American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Baumann475 discussed the required contents of such a notice
for request of subrogation. The court held that a very specifi-
471. Id. at 703.
472. Id. at 703 (Coyne, J., dissenting) (citing MINN. STAT. § 609.36 (1990)).
473. Id. at 704 (Coyne, J., dissenting). Justice Coyne argued, "the majority pre-
mised the coverage on the absence of an express exclusion of coverage for 'this par-
ticular evil'-i.e., the 'mishandling of the transference phenomenon.' " Id. (citing id.
at 702).
474. See, e.g., Bacich v. Homeland Ins. Co., 212 Minn. 375, 376, 3 N.W.2d 665
(1942).
475. 459 N.W.2d 923 (Minn. 1990).
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cally worded notice must be provided to the insurer at least
thirty days prior to settlement.
Baumann was injured in an automobile accident with an un-
derinsured motorist. American Family insured Baumann;
State Farm Insurance insured the other motorist. Because the
underinsured motorist's policy limited benefits at $25,000,
Baumann requested underinsured motorist coverage from her
own insurer, American Family. Baumann brought suit against
the underinsured motorist and sent a demand letter that noti-
fied American Family of Baumann's suit against the underin-
sured motorist.476 American Family did not respond. Two
weeks later a settlement was reached, State Farm paid Bau-
mann its $25,000 policy limits within two months. Baumann
notified American Family of the settlement nine months after
she received the $25,000 check . The issue presented to the
court was whether American Family had proper notice that its
right to claim subrogation would be terminated by the settle-
ment of the suit.
The notice necessary to preserve an insurer's right to subro-
gation was previously discussed in Schmidt v. Clothier,4 71 where
the court stated that an insurer with a right to subrogation
must receive thirty days written notice of the insured's inten-
tion to settle with the tortfeasor or the tortfeasor's insurer.479
This thirty day notice requirement gave the underinsurer an
opportunity to protect its potential right to subrogation by
paying underinsurance benefits before the release of the
tortfeasor.480
In Baumann, the court held that, although the letter did give
notice, it gave notice only impliedly. 4 ' Baumann's letter did
not specifically inform American Family that she and the
476. Id. at 924-25.
477. Id. at 925.
478. 338 N.W.2d 256 (Minn. 1983).
479. Id. at 263.
480. Id.
481. Baumann, 459 N.W.2d at 925. The court noted that the letter from Baumann
to American Family "did not inform American Family that the insured and State
Farm, the tortfeasor's insurer, had entered into a settlement" but that it did notify
American Family "that the insured considers the tortfeasor's liability insurance inad-
equate to fully compensate her for her injuries and that she will resort to her under-
insured motorist coverage to make up the shortfall." Id. at 925. The letter stated
that it was Baumann's intention to demand payment from State Farm of $25,000,
which, according to the court, made it "quite clear that it was her intention to settle
her action against the tortfeasor if her demand was met." Id.
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tortfeasor's insurer had entered into a settlement agree-
ment.48 2 Nor did the letter inform American Family that Bau-
mann considered the tortfeasor's liability insurance inadequate
and that she would turn to American Family.
48 3
Disappointed by the ambiguity of Baumann's notice in this
case, the court articulated specific requirements for such notice
in the future. Henceforth, an insured must give notice in writ-
ing within thirty days; identify the insured, the tortfeasor and
the tortfeasor's insurer; and disclose the limits of the
tortfeasor's automobile liability insurance.48 4 Without this
specific notice, a "release of the tortfeasor shall be deemed
prejudicial to the underinsurer.
' 48 5
Baumann requires specific notification so that insurers can
protect their subrogation rights. However, Baumann's articula-
tion of what topics need to be addressed was not required for a
determination of this case. Baumann's final letter did not meet
the notice requirements set forth in Schmidt because it did not
specifically state that settlement was near. Nonetheless, in the
future, insurers and insured parties must follow the more spe-
cific requirements of Baumann.
C. Insurable Interest in a Right of First Refusal
In general, persons whose property is foreclosed are pro-
vided a statutory redemption period.48 6 During this period,
the farmer has an insurable interest in the property subject to
the mortgage. In response to the farm depression of the
1980s,48 7 the Minnesota Legislature passed additional legisla-
tion which provided that where a farm has been acquired by
foreclosure, the creditor may not sell or lease that property to
a third party without first giving notice to the farmer and per-
482. The letter informed American Family that the insured would make demand
on the tortfeasor's policy, not that she would settle. It was only the court's own con-
clusion that this made Baumann's intention clear to American Family. Baumann, 459
N.W.2d at 925.
483. Id. at 926-27.
484. Id. at 927.
485. Id.
486. See MINN. STAT. § 580.12 (1990).
487. 1986 Minn. Laws ch. 398, art. 19. The legislature determined that many "of
this state's farmers are unable to meet current payments of interest and principal
payable on mortgages and other loan and land contracts and are threatened with the
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mitting him to meet the third party's offer.4 8 8 In Crowell v.
Delafield Farmers Mutual,4 9 the court determined that the right
of first refusal mandated by the legislature vested a farmer with
an insurable interest in the property even after the statutory
period of redemption had expired.
The Crowells owned a farm in Cottonwood County, Minne-
sota. The property was financed through the Federal Land
Bank of St. Paul and was insured through Delafield Farmers
Mutual Fire Insurance Company. The Crowells defaulted on
the mortgage, and the bank commenced foreclosure proceed-
ings. Before the Crowells refinanced the mortgage, and after
the statutory period of redemption had expired, a fire de-
stroyed the farmhouse. The Crowells made a claim to Dela-
field, whose policy was in effect at the time of the fire.
Delafield refused to honor the claim, arguing that the Crowells
did not have an insurable interest in the property after they
had defaulted on the mortgage and after the statutory redemp-
tion period had expired.49 ° The issue presented to the court
was whether the right of first refusal was an insurable interest
in real property, thereby mandating that Delafield honor the
claim.49 '
As early as 1921, in Banner Laundry Co. v. Great Eastern Casu-
alty Co. ,492 the court held that an insurable interest in property
was found whenever "by the destruction of property, [the
claimant] will suffer a loss, whether he has or has not any title
to, lien upon, or possession of the property itself. '493 Under
this pecuniary loss test, "any limited or qualified interest,
whether legal or equitable, or any expectancy of advantage,"
would suffice to create for the Crowells an insurable interest in
the farmhouse.494 The Crowells and Delafield agreed that the
pecuniary loss test applied. The Crowells argued that their
loss amounted to the expenses of renting a house after the fire
destroyed the farmhouse and to the repair of the building.
Delafield argued that, because the right of first refusal was only
488. MINN. STAT. § 500.24(6) (1990).
489. 463 N.W.2d 737 (Minn. 1990).
490. Id. at 738.
491. Id.
492. 148 Minn. 29, 180 N.W. 997 (1921).
493. Id. at 34, 180 N.W. at 999.
494. Id.; see Nathan v. St. Paul Mut. Ins. Co., 243 Minn. 430, 440, 68 N.W.2d 385,
392 (1955) (holding that insurable interest exists if the insured will suffer a loss re-
gardless of title, possession, or lien).
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an option and not a right to repurchase, there was only a po-
tential for a pecuniary loss.
49 5
The court held that the option to refinance the farmhouse
on which they had defaulted was an expectancy of advantage
or qualified interest. Therefore, the Crowells had an insurable
interest in the farmhouse in which they lived, even after the
statutory redemption period had expired. The court placed
heavy emphasis on the legislative intent to "grant farmers a
substantial right."' 4 96 The legislature, in response to the rural
economic emergency of the late 1980s, intended to provide re-
lief from the very realistic threat of farm foreclosure sales.
That purpose would be hindered if the court were to hold that
the Crowells did not have an insurable interest in the farm-
house. If the court had so held, the Crowells could not claim
insurance benefits and subsequently could not repurchase
their farm.
In Crowell, the court adopted a flexible rule designed to man-
ifest the legislature's intention. However, the flexible rule re-
lies entirely on the legislative intent to create a "substantial
right" for farmers. The inquiry into legislative intent relies en-
tirely on the broad sweep of the articulated purpose of the leg-
islative program rather than any specific legislative provision
granting farmers a substantial right. The right of first refusal
or any other relief for needy farmers can thereby be expanded
into contexts not previously intended or anticipated by the leg-
islature. Here, the right of first refusal, intended as a remedy
as between the farmer and the bank, is expanded without spe-
cific legislative guidance to become a remedy between the
farmer and the insurer.
Jeffrey J. Schueler
495. Crowell, 463 N.W.2d at 739. Delafield cited Antell v. Pearl Ins.'Co., 252 Minn.
118, 89 N.W.2d 726 (1958), for the rule that where a person takes out an insurance
policy based on the prospect of owning the property and then suffers a loss to the
property, the insurance policy is binding on the insurance company. But Delafield
distinguished the Crowell situation from that in Antell because, in Antell, the insured
had a binding contract to purchase the property and here Crowell had only an option
to repurchase the property. The Crowells instead noted the similarities between
Antell and the situation at bar. In Crowell, the plaintiffs, not the bank, had entered into
the insurance contract and had paid the insurance premium. Moreover, the Crowells
had already made a heavy financial investment in the property. Thus, the Crowells
would suffer a loss even though they had only a right of first refusal.
496. Crowell, 463 N.W.2d at 739; see MINN. STAT. § 500.24(6) (1990).
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X. MUNICIPAL LAW
Limitations on City Utility Franchise Statute
The Minnesota Corporate Utility Act prohibits a corporation
from operating a utility company within a city until the corpo-
ration receives a franchise 497 from the city.498 In City of St. Paul
v. Northern States Power Co. 499 the court addressed whether a
natural gas marketing company, which sold gas to customers
within the city of St. Paul, but used the pipelines and physical
facilities of another company, was a utility subject to the city's
franchise power. The court held that the statute granted the
franchise power to the city only over companies that actually
had pipelines in the city, not those which merely used another
company's pipelines. 500
Some background in the complex area of natural gas regula-
tion is helpful here. 50 ' The federal government has controlled
interstate sales of natural gas since 1938.502 One example of
federal regulation is the "open access" requirement, which, in
this case, required N.S.P., as the owner of the pipelines, to
transport Centran's gas.50 3 However, states are generally al-
lowed to control natural gas sales and movement within the
state's border.5 "4 In Minnesota, natural gas utilities are subject
to the franchise power of cities, which may prohibit a natural
gas utility from operating within the city.
50 5
497. A franchise is generally a right not held at common law, but a right which
must be granted by the sovereign by law. State cc rel. Peterson v. Quinlaven, 198
Minn. 65, 71, 268 N.W. 858, 862 (1936). "The right possessed must be such as
cannot be exercised without the express permission of the sovereign power,-a privi-
lege or immunity of a public nature which cannot be legally exercised without legisla-
tive grant." General Minn. Util. Co. v. Carlton County Coop. Power Ass'n., 221
Minn. 510, 519, 22 N.W.2d 673, 677 (1946). See generally 37 C.J.S. Franchises §§ 1-4
(1943).
498. MINN. STAT. § 300.03 (1990). The utility must compensate the city for the
franchise. Normally, a natural gas utility would compensate the city by paying the
city a franchise fee on the volume of gas that is sold.
499. 462 N.W.2d 379 (Minn. 1990).
500. Id. at 383.
501. See generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconstituting the Natural Gas Industry from
Wellhead to Burnertip, 9 ENERGY L.J. 1 (1988) (discussing history of natural gas industry
and regulation).
502. Pub. L. 75-688, 52 Stat. 821 (1938), now codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717z
(1990); see also Pierce, supra note 501, at 6.
503. See infra note 506.
504. Northwest Central Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Common of Kansas, 489
U.S. 493 (1989).
505. The city of St. Paul included in its charter, pursuant to the statute: "except as
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In N.S.P., Centran entered into contracts to supply natural
gas to industrial users located within the boundaries of St.
Paul. Centran did not own any pipeline within the city, so it
contracted with N.S.P. to move gas from a point outside of the
city to the users.50 6 N.S.P. did not pay a franchise fee for gas
simply transported to Centran's customers. The city believed
that Centran was a utility and thus could be prohibited from
doing business without a franchise from the city. 50 7 The Min-
nesota Supreme Court held that Centran was not operating as
a utility, and thus St. Paul did not have the power to require a
franchise.50 8
In response to St. Paul's demand that Centran get a
franchise, Centran argued that the franchise statute, by its
words, required a franchise only where the company wished
"to construct, maintain or operate a pipeline or conduit."' 9
Centran did not own any pipeline or conduit, so it argued that
the city had no power over it. The supreme court agreed with
this reasoning and thus held that Centran was "not engaging
otherwise provided by law, no person, firm or corporation shall place or maintain any
permanent or semipermanent fixtures in, over, upon or under any street or public
place for the purpose of operating a public utility without a franchise therefor from
the City." ST. PAUL CHARTER § 16.01. Although the city argued that the ordinance
should have a broad scope that included Centran, the court disagreed. N.S.P., 462
N.W.2d at 384; see also MINN. STAT. § 300.03 (1990).
506. Federal regulations required N.S.P. to enter into such a contract. Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission Order 436, Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Par-
tial Wellhead Decontrol, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,408 (1985). This order was upheld in Associ-
ated Gas Distrib. v. F.E.R.C., 824 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
507. The city brought an action seeking a declaratory judgment that Centraa must
obtain a franchise to sell natural gas to customers within the city, and the trial court
held in favor of Centran. The city also sought to enjoin N.S.P. from transporting the
gas. The trial court dismissed N.S.P. on summary judgment, because federal law
required N.S.P. to transport gas for the other companies. See City of St. Paul v.
Northern States Power Co., 450 N.W.2d 599, 603-04 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990), rev'd,
462 N.W.2d 379 (Minn. 1990).
The court of appeals upheld the dismissal of N.S.P, but reversed on the franchise
issue, holding that Centran was subject to the franchise power. Id. The court of
appeals based its decision on an earlier set of cases in which a city-owned gas utility
was prohibited from selling gas to a customer within the boundary of a neighboring
village. See Blaine v. Independent Sch. Dist., 272 Minn. 343, 138 N.W.2d 32 (1965)
(granting a permanent injunction). The court of appeals interpreted Blaine to define
a "corporation operating a utility" to include either a company operating pipelines
or one only making sales of gas within the city. N.S.P., 450 N.W.2d at 605. However,
the supreme court distinguished Blaine, holding that the case was based on a statute
that controls municipally owned utilities. N.S.P., 462 N.W.2d at 385; see MINN. STAT.
§ 413.321 (1990) (authorizing municipal corporations to operate gas utilities).
508. N.S.P., 462 N.W.2d at 383.
509. Id. (quoting MINN. STAT. § 300.03 (1990)).
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in franchisal activity subject to St. Paul regulation. '510
N.S.P. is the first Minnesota Supreme Court decision to in-
terpret the franchise statute since the open access rule changed
the nature of the natural gas industry. At the time the
franchise statute was written,5 ' there was no concept of an un-
bundled 512 utility which might sell gas or merely transport gas
for another vendor. As the definition of a utility changes, the
court has made it clear that the franchise power applies only to
companies with physical facilities, not to companies that simply
perform economic transactions within the city. The court
noted that requiring franchises in circumstances such as this
could impose a heavy burden on commerce.5 13 Energy compa-
nies which currently do not do business in Minnesota should
benefit most from this new definition of a "utility company."
Michael Fleming
XI. TAXATION
A. An Individual's Resident Status
A taxpayer who no longer lives in Minnesota demonstrates
an intent to retain his Minnesota domicile for income tax pur-
poses by returning when out-of-state work is unavailable. In
Manthey v. Commissioner,51 4 the Minnesota Supreme Court fur-
ther fictionalized the term "resident" by holding that the tax-
payer, who moved to Alaska for a ten-year period, remained
domiciled in Minnesota for income tax purposes because he
once returned during a work shortage in Alaska and ultimately
510. Id. In dicta, the court noted that there was nothing preventing the city from
charging fees from N.S.P. for the transportation of gas, basing that fee on the price
paid by the end user. This would have exactly the same economic effect as charging
Centran directly, at least as far as the city is concerned. Id. at 385.
511. The state has recognized utility corporations for nearly the entire history of
the state. See 1858 Minn. Laws ch. 55, § 1. At that time, a corporation was granted a
franchise to operate as a utility simply by virtue of applying to the Secretary of State.
Id. Later, utility corporations were required to obtain a franchise from a city in order
to operate within that city. 1893 Minn. Laws ch. 74, § 1.
512. "Unbundled" utilities provide separate charges for gas, transportation and
other services. N.S.P., 462 N.W.2d at 382.
513. See id. at 385 ("it is difficult to envision how the franchise scheme advocated
by St. Paul would not pose a very heavy burden on interstate commerce"). The court
noted that an out-of-state seller of natural gas would not be encouraged to bid on gas
sales within Minnesota if the seller did not know that it could be granted a franchise.
Id.
514. 468 N.W.2d 548 (Minn. 1991).
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retired to Minnesota. 5t5
Mr. Manthey moved to Alaska in 1976 to work on various
construction projects in connection with the Alaskan pipe-
line.5 ' 6 During the ten-year period Mr. Manthey lived in
Alaska, he returned to Minnesota for four to six weeks each
year to see his wife and children.517 Mr. Manthey maintained a
joint checking account in Minnesota 5 8 and retained his Minne-
sota driver's license, using the latter to secure Minnesota resi-
dent hunting licenses. 5 19
While living in Alaska, Mr. Manthey voted in elections, ac-
quired real estate, obtained a driver's license, purchased resi-
dent hunting and fishing licenses, and performed jury duty.52°
The state of Alaska considered Mr. Manthey to be a resident;
he was given the resident's preference in pipeline employment
and received dividends from the Alaskan Permanent Fund.52 '
Until 1980, Mr. and Mrs. Manthey filed joint Minnesota resi-
dent income tax returns; from 1981 to 1986, however, Mr.
Manthey claimed to be a resident of Alaska. 52 2 In 1986, Mr.
Manthey retired because of deteriorating health and moved
back to Minnesota. The Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue
made a determination that Mr. Manthey was a resident of Min-
nesota during the period from 1981 to 1986 and assessed addi-
tional income taxes, penalties and interest.523  The
Commissioner's order was affirmed in all respects by the Min-
nesota Tax Court,5 24 and again by the Minnesota Supreme
Court.5 2 5
A "resident" is a person domiciled in Minnesota.526 Once
515. Id. at 550.
516. Id. at 549.
517. Id. However, in 1979 a work shortage resulted in a longer visit. Id. During
1977, Mr. Manthey initiated marriage dissolution proceedings which were later
abandoned. Id.
518. Id. It is likely that Mr. Manthey also maintained bank account(s) in Alaska,




522. Id. Alaska repealed its individual income tax in 1980. Act to Repeal Individ-
ual Income Tax, ch. 1, 1980 Alaska Sess. Laws (2d Special Session) (codified at
ALAsKA STAT. § 43.20.012 (1990)).
523. Manthey, 468 N.W.2d at 549.
524. Id.
525. Id. at 550.
526. MINN. STAT. § 290.01, subd. 7 (1990).
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established, a Minnesota domicile is retained until the taxpayer
combines physical presence in another jurisdiction with the
demonstrated intent to remain there permanently or for an in-
definite period of time.5 27 Thus, "intent" is the critical issue
for taxpayers no longer living in Minnesota and claiming tax
residency in another state. Rules promulgated by the Commis-
sioner of Revenue set forth no less than twenty-six items to
consider when determining a taxpayer's intent with respect to
domicile.528 Prior cases on the question of intent suggest that
courts are free to sift through the Commissioner's list to ex-
tract and emphasize those items supportive of a desired
result.529
The Manthey court found that Mr. Manthey intended to re-
main in Alaska only so long as he could work there,53 0 noting
further that Mr. Manthey had other "significant ties with the
State of Minnesota," '5 3' including the provision of financial
support to his wife and children, retention of a Minnesota
driver's license, and purchases of Minnesota resident hunting
licenses.53 2 The court also took pains to mention Mr. Man-
they's "acceptance and enjoyment of benefits accorded Minne-
527. MINN. R. 8001.0300, subpt. 2.
528. Unfortunately, the rules do not contain guidance as to which items, if any, are
to be given the greatest weight, nor is there an indication that a simple majority in
favor of one jurisdiction over another should be dispositive. MINN. R. 8001.0300,
subpt. 3.
529. For example, in Commissioner of Revenue v. Stamp, 296 N.W.2d 867, 868
(Minn. 1980), the taxpayers claimed to have changed their domicile to Florida after
having purchased and furnished a residence there and relinquished the homestead
tax classification for their Minnesota residence. The Stamp court attached considera-
ble weight to the fact that the taxpayers spent seven months of the year in Minnesota.
Id. at 870. The court also emphasized the taxpayers' failure to terminate their Min-
nesota social connections, even though there was evidence that the Stamps had es-
tablished new social associations in Florida. Id. at 869. The Stamp court was similarly
unimpressed with evidence that the taxpayers had long expressed a desire to move to
Florida after their children had grown, had registered to vote and voted in Florida,
and had obtained Florida drivers' licenses, while allowing their Minnesota licenses to
expire. Id. at 868-69.
The Stamps lost their battle with the Commissioner, as did the taxpayer in
Sandberg v. Commissioner of Revenue, 383 N.W.2d 277, 284 (Minn. 1986). Mr.
Sandberg purported to have changed his domicile to Texas where he spent over half
of his time, living in Minnesota only fifty to sixty days during the year. Id. at 278. But
while time spent in Minnesota was an important factor in Stamp, it didn't help Mr.
Sandberg. Instead, the court chose to stress evidence that Mr. Sandberg lived in
Texas on a month-to-month lease without a personal telephone number. Id.
530. Manthey v. Commissioner, 468 N.W.2d 548, 550 (Minn. 1991).
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sota residents. '53 3  Thus, the Manthey court seemed
unconcerned with the amount of time the taxpayer spent in
Minnesota. 534 Rather, the court viewed as critical the fact that
Mr. Manthey ventured back to Minnesota when work in Alaska
was slow, 53 5 a consideration which does not even appear on
the Commissioner's exhaustive list.
5 3 6
The approach taken in Manthey, combined with the Commis-
sioner's excessively long list of considerations, has complicated
a matter which ought to lend itself to both simplicity and cer-
tainty. Moreover, the result, at least in Mr. Manthey's case, is
clearly unfair and defies common sense. It remains to be seen
how far the court will go to assist states in exacting tax reve-
nues from individuals who do not have substantive connec-
tions to Minnesota. But in this age of record state budget
deficits, the term "resident" will no doubt assume an increas-
ingly expansive meaning.
53 7
B. Unconstitutional State Taxes
States may invoke the "acceptance-of-benefits doctrine
'538
to preclude taxpayers from challenging a tax which unlawfully
discriminates against obligations of the federal government.
In Cambridge State Bank v. Roemer,5"9 the Minnesota Supreme
Court held that the petitioners, a group of over 170 banks,
533. Id. at 550. This means, presumably, that a tax on Mr. Manthey's entire an-
nual income is a fair price to pay for a resident hunting license.
534. The court purported to balance this factor in Mr. Manthey's favor. Id. at 550.
For all that is apparent, however, the court was equally moved by the fact that Mr.
Manthey obtained Minnesota resident hunting licenses. Id. Further, since Mr. Man-
they spent all but four to six weeks of the year in Alaska, the absence of Minnesota
social connections did not appear to have influenced this court. Id. at 549.
535. Id. at 550.
536. MINN. R. 8001.0300, subpt. 3 (1989). An interesting comparison case from
another jurisdiction is Comptroller of the Treasury v. Haskin, 472 A.2d 70 (Md.
1983). In Haskin, the Maryland Court of Appeals flatly rejected the Comptroller's
argument that a Maryland domiciliary who accepts employment in a foreign country
and moves there for an indefinite time, but later returns to Maryland, has continued
to maintain a Maryland domicile as a matter of law. Id. at 76; see Survey of Developments
in Maryland Law 1983-84, 44 MD. L. REV. 254, 654-56 (1985).
537. See Seth Goldstein, Note, "Resident" Taxpayers: Internal Consistency, Due Process,
and State Income Taxation, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 119 (1991). Goldstein argues that many
states, faced with rising costs and shrinking federal assistance, are creating politically
painless mechanisms to raise tax revenues from nonvoters, one of which is to sub-
stantially broaden the definition of "resident" for individual income tax purposes.
Id.
538. See infra notes 547-548 and accompanying text.
539. 457 N.W.2d 716 (Minn. 1990).
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were barred from attacking the constitutionality of a bank ex-
cise tax injurious to the federal government because the banks
had used the statute to reduce their taxes.540 In dicta, the
court also suggested that, where the taxpayer was not itself ec-
onomically disadvantaged by the discriminatory tax, retroac-
tive relief need not be granted.54'
Directly at issue for the parties in Cambridge was the fate of a
refund claim covering excise taxes paid by the banks from
1979 to 1983.542 The excise tax exempted interest from cer-
tain state obligations while including interest earned on fed-
eral obligations.543 The trial court sustained the banks' claim
that the tax violated the Supremacy Clause 44 of the United
States Constitution and ordered the state to refund, with inter-
est, taxes paid by the banks during the period covered by the
refund claims.545
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's de-
cision that the tax in question impermissibly discriminated
against obligations issued by the federal government. 546 Hav-
ing concluded that the Minnesota tax was unconstitutional,
Justice Yetka, writing for the court, turned to the issue of rem-
edies, beginning with the state's use of the "acceptance-of-
benefits doctrine. '547 With no analysis beyond a conclusory
540. Id. at 720.
541. Id. at 721.
542. Id. at 717.
543. Id.
544. In McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), the United States
established a rule under the Supremacy Clause that federal government property is
immune from state and local taxation unless permission is expressly granted by Con-
gress. 31 U.S.C. § 3124(a) (1982) (formerly numbered § 742) permits a "nondis-
criminatory franchise tax" on obligations of the United States.
545. Cambridge, 457 N.W.2d at 718.
546. Id. at 719. The Minnesota Supreme Court followed the rule announced by
the United States Supreme Court in Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Garner, 459 U.S.
392 (1983). The circumstances presented in Memphis are identical to those in the
instant case, except that the Tennessee bank tax at issue there exempted the earnings
from all state and local obligations. Memphis, 459 U.S. at 394. Noting a potentially
severe burden on federal borrowing flowing from such discriminatory state taxing
schemes, the Memphis court held the Tennessee tax to be unconstitutional. The
Court relied on an amicus curia brief filed by the United States which stated that, if all
50 states enacted tax schemes similar to Tennessee's, annual federal borrowing costs
would increase by $280 million. Id. at 398 n. 8.
547. 457 N.W.2d at 720. First injected into Minnesota jurisprudence through the
case of Byard v. Commissioner of Taxation, 209 Minn. 215, 296 N.W. 10 (1941), the
doctrine prevents a taxpayer from challenging one provision of a statute while de-
manding, concurrently, the advantages accorded in another provision of the same
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declaration that the "acceptance-of-benefits doctrine" remains
valid law in Minnesota, Justice Yetka applied it to estop the
banks from prosecuting their claims.548
Although the banks' claim is held to be estopped by the "ac-
ceptance-of-benefits doctrine," the Cambridge court proceeded
to consider the mandate of Minnesota Statutes section
645.20,549 which concerns statutes adjudicated to be unconsti-
tutional. 55 0 As applied in this context, section 645.20 would
effectively repeal the tax exemptions for interest earned on
certain state obligations while retaining the tax levied on inter-
est earned from federal obligations. 55' The Cambridge court
concluded that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing
to apply section 645.20.552 Nonetheless, Justice Yetka main-
tained that section 645.20 should not be applied retroactively
to assess back taxes on the unlawfully exempted income.553
Two rationales are advanced for the court's decision. The
statute. Id. In Byard, for example, the taxpayer sought to use a statute permitting the
proration of income for changes in tax rates while attacking its constitutionality. Id.
at 217, 296 N.W. at 12. See atso Gale v. Commissioner of Taxation, 228 Minn. 345,
352, 37 N.W.2d 711, 716 (1949), where the taxpayer argued for the application of a
statute allowing the exclusion of 50 percent of long-term capital gains from taxable
income, and asserted simultaneously, that the limitations provision set forth in the
same statute was unconstitutional.
548. Cambridge, 457 N.W.2d at 720. Regrettably, the Cambridge court does not ad-
dress the question of why the "acceptance-of-benefits doctrine" should be used to
shield the state from attacks on an unlawful practice injurious to the federal govern-
ment. After all, by exempting from taxation the interest on state and not federal
obligations, the state is reducing its own borrowing costs at the expense of the fed-
eral government. On these facts, the equities appear to go against the state as the
recipient of unjust enrichment, rather than the banks who are merely asking for a
refund to which they can lay no equitable claim.
549. MINN. STAT. § 645.20 (1990).
550. Subject to certain conditions expressed therein, section 645.20 requires
courts so ruling to invalidate only those provisions of the statute which render it
unconstitutional. MINN. STAT. § 645.20 (1990) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
If any provision of a law is found to be unconstitutional and void, the re-
maining provisions of the law shall remain valid, unless the court finds the
valid provisions of the law are so essentially and inseparably connected with,
and so dependent upon, the void provisions that the court cannot presume
the legislature would have enacted the remaining valid provisions without
the void one.
MINN. STAT. § 645.20 (1990).
551. The exemptions challenged in Cambridge were added many years after the tax
itself was enacted, leading the court to logically conclude that the legislature would
retain the tax without the offending preferences for the state obligations. Cambridge,
457 N.W.2d at 720-21.
552. Id. at 721.
553. Id. at 721-23.
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first rationale concerns the factors set forth in Chevron Oil Co. v.
Huson,5 4 which militate against retroactive application of new
principles of law.555 The second rationale embraces the ques-
tion of whether the United States Supreme Court decision in
McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco556 re-
quires a retroactive remedy. 57 But Justice Yetka declines to
apply the McKesson rule with regard to retroactivity, citing Mc-
Kesson only to achieve prospective tax parity through a sever-
ance of the tax exemption provisions.558
554. 404 U.S. 97 (1971). The considerations for non-retroactive application are:
(1) The decision to be applied non-retroactively must establish a new princi-
ple of law; (2) the merits and demerits in each case must be weighed by
looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect,
and whether retroactive application will further or retard its operation; (3)
whether substantial inequity would result if the decision was applied
retroactively.
Id. at 106-07.
555. Cambridge, 457 N.W.2d at 722-23. Cambridge, however, was decided before
James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 2439 (1991), in which the United
States Supreme Court relegated Chevron to a relatively minor role in future jurispru-
dence. The Beam plurality held that a new rule of law, if applied retroactively to the
parties in the decision announcing it, must be applied retroactively to all other liti-
gants. Id. Consequently, the equitable factors in Chevron can be applied only to de-
cide whether a new rule of law should be given "pure prospectivity"-that is, applied
solely with reference to future conduct. Of course, in Memphis itself, the tax was de-
clared unconstitutional, but the entire issue of remedies, including retroactive appli-
cation of those remedies, was remanded back to the Tennessee court. Memphis Bank
& Trust v. Garner, 459 U.S. 392, 399 (1983).
556. 110 S. Ct. 2238 (1990).
557. Cambridge State Bank v. Roemer, 457 N.W.2d 716, 721 (Minn. 1990). McKesson
presents the question of whether a taxpayer, having successfully challenged a state
tax as violative of the Commerce Clause, may be denied retroactive relief from the
State. In McKesson, a Florida liquor excise tax extended preferential treatment for
beverages made from certain citrus, grape and sugarcane products common to Flor-
ida. McKesson, 110 S. Ct. at 2243. McKesson Corp., a liquor wholesaler, argued in
state court that the discriminatory tax unlawfully burdened interstate commerce. Id.
at 2243-44. The Florida Supreme Court agreed, but refused to order a refund, citing
equitable considerations, including the state's reliance on a "presumptively valid stat-
ute" and the likelihood that McKesson simply passed on the tax burden to its own
customers. Id. McKesson held that absent retroactive relief, the taxpayer has suffered
a deprivation of property without due process of law. Id. at 2250. However, the
court stressed equalization of treatment as the remedial objective, holding that the
State may raise taxes on the favored group in lieu of refunding excess taxes paid by
the disadvantaged taxpayer class. Id. at 2252.
A companion case, American Trucking Ass'n v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2323 (1990),
interprets McKesson to hold that equitable considerations are relevant in defining the
scope of the constitutional right, not the remedy for violations of the right. See The
Supreme Court-Leading Cases, 104 HARV. L. REV. 188, 195-96 (1990).
558. Cambridge, 457 N.W.2d at 721. Justice Yetka distinguishes McKesson on the
question of retroactivity by noting the presence in that case of an economically disad-
vantaged taxpayer, a characterization which cannot be seriously applied to the bank
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On one level, Cambridge is merely a foiled attempt by a group
of banks to cash in on an injury done to an entirely different
party: the federal government. On a more important level,
however, Cambridge nullifies a significant economic incentive
for taxpayers to challenge unconstitutional state taxes detri-
mental to the federal government. Providing windfalls to en-
courage taxpayer policing of state tax policies may be
necessary to discourage overreaching. Additionally, by focus-
ing solely on the degree of economic harm suffered by the tax-
payer when defining a remedy, Cambridge suggests that the
state may act with impunity when invading the economic rights
of the federal government.
PhilipJ. Tilton
XII. TORTS
Foreseeability in Light of Special Circumstances
In Whaley v. Anderson,559 the Minnesota Supreme Court con-
sidered whether a truck driver could have foreseen that an-
other truck driver would move his truck while he was making a
delivery, thereby causing injury to a third party. The court re-
instated the trial court's grant of summary judgment, holding
that it was not foreseeable that one truck driver would move
another driver's truck at a loading dock.56 °
Whaley was a relief truck driver. While making a delivery,
his coworker moved a delivery truck which Anderson had left
at a loading dock with the keys in the ignition. As Whaley's
coworker was getting out of Anderson's truck, the truck rolled
group in Cambridge. Id. Justice Yetka is obviously correct in his assessment that the
banks suffered no economic disadvantage as a result of the tax exemption. Nonethe-
less, it is equally obvious that the economically advantaged party is before the Cam-
bridge court. As discussed earlier, supra note 548, the state's discriminatory taxing
scheme resulted in its own unjust enrichment. A retroactive tax assessment on the
unlawfully exempted interest will likely have an adverse impact on market demand
for the state's obligations, while possibly increasing investor interest in debt instru-
ments issued by the federal government. Moreover, forcing the State to take politi-
cally unpopular measures such as a retroactive tax assessment should have a
deterrent effect on future transgressions. Thus, while it is true that McKesson cannot
be straightforwardly applied here to remedy an economic disadvantage, no reason is
offered as to why it cannot be expanded upon to impose justice on the party unfairly
advantaged.
559. 461 N.W.2d 913 (Minn. 1990).
560. Id. at 914.
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backwards, pinning Whaley to the loading dock.56 '
The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of An-
derson, the truck owner, concluding there were no special cir-
cumstances which would make it reasonably foreseeable that
another driver would move the owner's truck while the owner
was making a delivery. The court of appeals reversed.56
The Minnesota Supreme Court reinstated the decision of the
trial court.56
The Minnesota Supreme Court looked to the "special cir-
cumstances" rule 56 5 in reaching its decision. Special circum-
stances that create a greater risk of harm may make it
unreasonable for a party not to have foreseen the potential for
harm.566 Anderson was not liable to Whaley because the evi-
dence firmly established that truck drivers generally do not
move other trucks at loading docks.567 The court concluded
that there was no genuine issue of any material fact, entitling
Anderson to summary judgment.5 68
The dissent in Whaley suggests that the majority misapplied
the precedents laid down in State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Grain Belt Breweries, Inc. 5 69 and Illinois Farmers Insurance Co. v.
Tapemark.570 The dissent argues persuasively that summary
judgment was improper and the case should be tried to a jury
561. Id. at 913.
562. Id.
563. Id. at 913.
564. Id. at 914. The court pointed out that Minnesota common law generally in-
sulates a motor vehicle owner from liability for damages caused by the negligent acts
of a thief. See Wannebo v. Gates, 227 Minn. 194, 201-02, 34 N.W.2d 695, 699-700
(1948).
565. The "special circumstances" rule was adopted in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Grain Belt Breweries, Inc., 309 Minn. 376, 245 N.W.2d 186 (1976). The rule
provides: "[s]pecial circumstances which impose a greater potentiality of foreseeable
risk or more serious injury, or require a lesser burden of preventative action, may be
deemed to impose an unreasonable risk on, and a legal duty to, third persons." Id. at
380, 245 N.W.2d at 189.
The court in Grain Belt pointed out that "although the failure to remove an igni-
tion key might not render the motorist liable for the consequences of an intermed-
dler's carelessness under normal circumstances, such omission may constitute
actionable negligence where the vehicle has been parked unattended in a locality"
frequented by minors, criminals or drunkards. Id. at 379-80, 245 N.W.2d at 189
(quoting 45 A.L.R. 3d 818).
566. Id. at 380, 245 N.W.2d at 189.
567. Whaley, 461 N.W.2d at 914.
568. Id.
569. 309 Minn. 376, 245 N.W.2d 186 (1976).
570. 273 N.W.2d 630 (Minn. 1978).
1992]
75
et al.: A Survey of the Important Decisions of the Minnesota Supreme Cour
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1992
WILLIAM MITCHELL LA W REVIEW
to determine whether the facts support a conclusion of no
"special circumstances" from which it would be reasonably
foreseeable that another person would move Anderson's
truck.57 1 This argument is based on well-settled law in Minne-
sota that issues of negligence and proximate cause are ques-
tions of fact that ordinarily are not appropriate for
determination on summary judgment.57 2 Thus, the court in
Whaley appears to give lip service to the "special circum-
stances" rule without truly applying the doctrine.
Victoria L. Seltun
XIII. WORKERS' COMPENSATION
A. Permanent Partial Disability Benefits
Under the Minnesota Workers' Compensation Act, an in-
jured worker who is permanently partially disabled receives
compensation for lost wages as well as compensation for the
functional impairment resulting from his or her injury.573 In
order to promote objectivity and consistency in the evaluation
of the degree of functional impairment attributed to a worker's
injury, the Commissioner adopted a schedule for permanent
partial disability benefits.574 However, the Commissioner also
adopted a rule, Minnesota Rule 5223.0010(2) and (3), which
prevented employees from receiving permanent partial disabil-
ity benefits if their injuries fell outside the schedule.575 In
Weber v. City of Inver Grove Heightsy 6 the court held that the
promulgation of such an exclusionary rule was beyond the
commissioner's statutory authority.577
571. 461 N.W.2d at 914 (Yetka, J., dissenting). The dissent stressed that a jury
could find that a truck left unlocked, with its engine running invited someone to
move it. The facts established at trial indicated that the truck was blocking a single
loading dock in a parking lot congested with noon traffic. The dissent argues that the
facts and circumstances must be developed and a jury permitted to determine
whether the truck owner's actions constituted negligence. Id. at 914-15 (Yetka, J.,
dissenting).
572. Id. at 915 (Yetka, J., dissenting) (quoting Sauter v. Sauter, 244 Minn. 482,
486, 70 N.W.2d 351, 354 (1955)).
573. MINN. STAT. § 176.101(3) (1990).
574. See MINN. STAT. § 176.105(4)(b) (1990) (granting the commissioner authority
to adopt procedures setting forth rules for the schedule for permanent partial disa-
bility which the commissioner deems appropriate).
575. See MINN. R. 5223.010 (1990).
576. 461 N.W.2d 918 (Minn. 1990).
577. Id. at 922; see also MINN. R. 5223.0010(2), (3) (1990) which states, "only the
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The issue in Weber was whether the legislature impliedly au-
thorized the Commissioner to refuse compensation for some
injuries because they were not included in the permanent par-
tial disability schedule.5 7 8 The court held that nothing in the
enabling legislation granted authority to exclude completely
some disabilities that caused functional impairment.5 7 9 Thus,
the court held that the rule excluding nonscheduled injuries
from eligibility for permanent partial disability compensation
was invalid because it was not within the Commissioner's au-
thority.580 The court emphasized that allowing the Commis-
sioner to exclude certain injuries from eligibility for
permanent partial compensation because they were not in-
cluded in the schedule would exalt consistency and objectivity
above the very purpose of compensation for functional
impairment.58 '
The Weber court suggested that compensation judges assign
nonscheduled injuries to the closest compensable category in
the schedule.58 2 In doing so, the court preserved the objectiv-
ity and consistency of the schedule without denying anyone the
statutory right to benefits for functional impairment.58 3
B. Obstruction of Benefits
An employee can recover damages from any person who dis-
charges, threatens to discharge, or obstructs an employee
seeking workers' compensation benefits.58 4 In Flaherty v. Lind-
say,585 the court held that Minnesota Statutes section 176.82586
categories in the schedules in this chapter may be used when rating the extent of a
disability .... A category not found within this chapter shall not be used to deter-
mine permanent partial disability."
578. Id. at 921 Weber, however, did not challenge the validity of the schedule in its
entirety.
579. Id., "we see nothing in the statute to enlarge the express powers, even by
implication, to exclude disabilities completely."
580. A rule adopted in pursuit of a legislative goal cannot conflict with the very
purpose of permanent partial disability compensation. Id. at 922.
581. Id.
582. Id.
583. See id. The Weber decision also addresses the effect the decision has on claims
under MINN. STAT. § 176.101(3)(t)(2) (1990). See David A. Stofferahn, Permanent Par-
tial Disability, in UNDERSTANDING MINNESOTA WORKERS' COMPENSATION § 4, at 6
(Minn. Inst. of Legal Educ., Oct. 1991).
584. See MINN. STAT. § 176.82 (1990).
585. 467 N.W.2d 30 (Minn. 1991).
586. MINN. STAT. § 176.82 (1990) ("any person discharging or threatening to dis-
charge an employee for seeking workers' compensation benefits or in any manner
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does not apply to mere attempts to obstruct workers' compensa-
tion benefits. 587 Some actual denial or disruption in the re-
ceipt of benefits must occur to warrant recovery.588
In Flaherty, an injured police officer brought an action claim-
ing that the police chief and city manager intended to obstruct
his receipt of benefits.589 He claimed they did so by offering
him a job that they knew he would reject, knowing that this
rejection would relieve the city of its workers' compensation
obligations.590 The court held that, while the city's offer was
unsuitable and offensive, it did not result in an actual obstruc-
tion of benefits.59' Thus, the employee could not recover
under Minnesota Statutes section 176.82.592
Minnesota Statutes section 176.82 has consistently been
construed narrowly because it is the only part of the workers'
compensation scheme that allows an employee to recover dam-
ages.59 3 Consequently, a narrow construction is necessary to
comply with the mandate of exclusivity.59 4 Flaherty defers
to the exclusive nature of workers' compensation and does not
inhibit employers from attempting to reemploy injured
workers. 59
C. Apportionment Pursuant to Section 176.131(1)(a)
If an employer hires an employee with a preexisting injury
which is registered with the Special Compensation Fund and
intentionally obstructing an employee seeking workers' compensation benefits is lia-
ble in a civil action for damages incurred by the employee .... ").
587. Flaherty, 467 N.W.2d 30, 33; see also Bergeson v. United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co., 414 N.W.2d 724, 727 (Minn. 1987) (requiring egregious conduct to main-
tain an action under this statute).
588. Flaherty, 467 N.W.2d at 33.
589. Id. at 31.
590. The employee was a police officer with a degree in criminal justice earning
$30,000. He was injured, and his restrictions prevented him from resuming full time
patrol duties. Subsequently, the city offered him a job as a code enforcement officer,
which involved dog-catching and ticket-writing that was usually performed by college
students and paid $16,484. Id. at 32.
591. Id. at 32.
592. Id. at 33.
593. See Bergeson v. United States, 414 N.W.2d 724, 727 (Minn. 1987) (holding
that allowing a civil action for any wrongdoing by an employer would counteract the
exclusivity principle).
594. Under the Minnesota Workers' Compensation Act, the employee gives up his
or her right to sue in common law for the employer's assumption of liability for all
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there is a subsequent injury which is made substantially greater
by the employee's preexisting impairment, the Special Com-
pensation Fund will pay part of the employer's liability. Under
Minnesota Statutes section 176.131 (1) (a), there will be an ap-
portionment of liability between the injuries, and the Special
Compensation Fund will reimburse the employer for the por-
tion of benefits that is attributed to the subsequent injury.
However, in Schreiner v. C.S. McCrossan, Inc.,596 the court held
that apportionment pursuant to section 176.131(1)(a) 597 ap-
plies regardless of whether the preexisting disability was regis-
tered prior to the effective date of that section. 98
Prior to 1987, the court had held that an earlier version of
the second injury law did not authorize the Special Compensa-
tion Fund to apportion liability between pre-registration and
post-registration injuries.599 The Fund was simply obligated to
reimburse the employer for all the compensation due after the
deductibles even when clear medical evidence established that
over fifty percent of the disability was attributable to earlier
injuries.6 0 In 1987, the legislature amended section 176.131
to permit apportionment. 60'
In Schreiner, the issue was whether apportionment under the
amended version of section 176.131 would apply despite the
fact that the preexisting injury was registered in 1986.6o2 The
court held that it would,60 3 reasoning that, while the law gov-
erning the rights and liabilities regarding compensation is gen-
erally the law in effect at the time of injury, the employer's
right to reimbursement "remains contingent until that time
when the employee sustains a second injury. '"604 Conse-
596. 465 N.W.2d 917 (Minn. 1991).
597. The statute provides in relevant part:
If the disability caused by the subsequent injury is made substantially
greater by the employee's registered preexisting physical impairment, there
shall be apportionment of liability among all injuries. The special compen-
sation fund shall only reimburse for that portion of the compensation, medi-
cal expenses, and rehabilitation expenses attributed to the subsequent
injury after the applicable deductible has been met.
MINN. STAT. § 176.131(1)(a) (1990).
598. Schreiner, 465 N.W.2d at 920.
599. Id. at 919 (citing Koski v. Erie Mining Co., 300 Minn. 1, 5, 223 N.W.2d 470,
473 (1973)).
600. Schreiner, 465 N.W.2d at 919.
601. Id.
602. Id. at 918.
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quently, Schreiner's post-registration injury in 1988, his right
to compensation, and his 1988 employer's liability were gov-
erned by the statute as amended in 1987.6"5
The Schreiner court noted that section 176.131 was amended
in 1987 in response to the financial burden it was placing on
the Fund.60 6 The Schreiner decision takes the burden off the
Fund even in cases where the registration was accepted before
the statute was amended to allow for apportionment. Employ-
ers and insurers now must be aware that their liabilities have
increased with respect to injuries registered with the Fund
prior to 1987.
D. Maximum Medical Improvement and Subsection (3)(e) Jobs
Minnesota Statutes section 176.101(3)(j) provides that, if an
employee begins to work a job offered pursuant to subsection
(3)(e) and is then unable to continue working, the employee
shall receive temporary total compensation.6 7 Jobs are of-
fered pursuant to subsection (3)(e) after an employee who has
been receiving temporary total compensation reaches maxi-
mum medical improvement. Such jobs must be sufficiently
similar to the injured employee's former job. In Sabby v.
Copasan, Inc.,608 the court held that section 176.101(3)(j) ap-
plies to employees who return to (3)(e) jobs within ninety days
of maximum medical improvement 60 9 and who, subsequently,
become medically unable to continue working because of the
injury.
6t °
Under subdivision (3)(j), it is clear that employees returning
to work during the ninety-day post-improvement period will
get temporary total benefits if they are unable to continue
working during that same time period. The issue in Sabby was
whether an employee who goes back to work during the
ninety-day post-improvement period will be entitled to receive
605. Id. at 920.
606. Id. at 919.
607. MINN. STAT. § 176.101(3)(j) (1990) ("if the employee has started the job of-
fered under subdivision 3e and is medically unable to continue at that job because of
the injury, that employee shall receive temporary total compensation pursuant to
clause (b) .... ); see also MINN. STAT. § 176.101(3)(e) (1990).
608. 462 N.W.2d 603 (Minn. 1990).
609. MMI is "the date after which no further significant recovery from or signifi-
cant lasting improvement to an injury can reasonably be anticipated, based upon rea-
sonable medical probability." MINN. STAT. § 176.011(25) (1990).
610. Sabby, 462 N.W.2d at 604.
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temporary total benefits if, because of the injury, the employee
becomes unable to continue working after the ninety-day pe-
riod has run.6 t '
Sabby held that it was irrelevant whether the employee
stopped working at the (3) (e) job before or after the ninety-day
period had expired.612 Therefore, when an employee becomes
medically unable to continue working sometime beyond the
ninety-day period, he or she is still entitled to receive tempo-
rary total compensation pursuant to subdivision (3)(j).61 3
After Sabby, employees may be more willing to return to
work at a (3) (e) job, and employers will have a monetary incen-
tive to present the employee with a suitable alternative job.
Unfortunately, this decision may make it difficult for employers
and insurers to determine when their liability for temporary
total disability is terminated.6 14
E. Subrogation Claims Under Section 176.061(6)
Ordinarily, when a worker suffers an injury that is compensa-
ble by workers' compensation but is caused in whole or in part
by a third party, the worker can sue the third party and recover
on the tort claim in its entirety. 61 5 In such a case, Minnesota
Statutes section 176.061(6) provides for allocation of part of
the employee's tort award to the employer who has already
paid the employee's workers' compensation benefits.61 6 This
allocation satisfies the subrogation right granted to employers
by section 176.061.617
The employer's subrogation right, however, need not be as-




614. The Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals limited the circumstances in
which MINN. STAT. § 176.101(3) applies in Denny v. Halcon, 44 W.C.D. 290 (Minn.
Workers Comp. Ct. App. 1990). See also ToddJ. Thun,Job Offer and Determinable Bene-
fits Before and After the Job Offer, in UNDERSTANDING MINNESOTA WORKERS' COMPENSA-
TION § 2, at 14-16 (Minn. Inst. of Legal Educ., Oct. 1991).
615. See generally MINN. STAT. § 176.061 (1990).
If an injury or death for which benefits are payable is caused under circum-
stances which created a legal liability for damages on the part of a party
other than the employer . . . legal proceedings may be taken by the em-
ployee or the employee's dependents in accordance with clause (a), or by
the employer ... in accordance with clause (b).
Id. subd. 5.
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its own statutory cause of action for medical expenses and
other compensation which has been paid or is payable.6 18
Thus, the employer may settle its subrogation or indemnity
claim directly with the third party.61 9 In Foistad v. Eder,620 the
court held that when a workers' compensation carrier settles
with a third party tortfeasor prior to trial, the allocation
formula of Minnesota Statutes section 176.061(6) does not
apply.62'
The Folstad court examined Keenan v. Hydra-Mac, Inc. ,622
where the court held that the formula in section 176.061(6)
had to be applied when settlement was reached during trial.623
The issue remaining for the Folstad court was whether section
176.061(6) should be applied when a compensation carrier set-
tles with a third party tortfeasor prior to trial. 624 The court
held that neither the formula nor the collateral source deduc-
tion would apply in such a situation.625
The court reasoned that the employer-insurer, like the em-
ployee, can assert its cause of action separately and thereby
separate the claims into damages recoverable under workers'
compensation and damages not recoverable under workers'
626compensation. There is no need, therefore, to use the sec-
tion 176.061(6) formula or the collateral source statute.627
"When the subrogated damages have been separated out of
the plaintiff's action and settled by the compensation carrier
prior to trial, there is nothing left for the collateral source stat-
ute to act upon.
628
The Folstad decision is significant to the extent that the court
drew a bright line between it and Keenan.62 9 The section
176.061(6) formula simply will not apply if the compensation
carrier settles at any time prior to the commencement of
trial.63 0 Folstad also clearly explains the rights of the employee
618. MINN. STAT. § 176.061(7) (1990).
619. See id.
620. 467 N.W.2d 608 (Minn. 1991).
621. Id. at 612.
622. 434 N.W.2d 463 (Minn. 1989).
623. Id. at 466.
624. See Folstad, 467 N.W.2d at 609.
625. Id. at 613.
626. Id. at 612.
627. Id. at 613.
628. Id.
629. Id. at 612-13.
630. Id. at 613. The commencement of trial is the selection of the jury. Id.
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and the employer-insurer under section 176.061. It sets forth
various paths either party can take to recover from a third
party63l and makes it clear that the employer-insurer has a sep-
arate cause of action which is not derivative of the employee's
cause of action.63 2
Elizabeth A. Raleigh
631. Id.
632. It is possible that Folstad may reduce the value of a reverse-Naig settlement to
the third-party defendant. For example, permanent partial disability is not a separate
compensable item at common law. Usually the employee's largest recovery at com-
mon law is for pain and suffering and emotional distress. Being left with a permanent
partial disability probably increases this award. Thus, the value of a reverse-Naig may
be limited to the amount of past and future wage loss and past and future medical
expenses. William M. Bradt, Third-Party Issues in Workers' Compensation, in UNDER-
STANDING MINNESOTA WORKERS' COMPENSATION § 5 (Minn. Inst. of Legal Educ., Oct.
1991).
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